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ABSTRACT
Scholars have paid intensive attention to product recalls over the past two decades. Prior
studies show that product recalls negatively affect the recalling firm’s sales, consumer-based
brand equity, and firm value. However, less attention has been paid to the spillover effect of
product recalls on the market value of the recalling firm’s competitors in the same industry, and
the long-term effect of product recalls on firm reputation. The objective of this dissertation is to
fill up these research gaps through two essays.
In Essay 1, I investigate factors affecting the spillover effect of a product recall on the firm
value of competitors. Findings show that a product recall by a firm with higher corporate product
reliability more hurts the market value of its competitor (negative spillover). The negative
spillover effect is weaker for competitors with higher corporate product reliability. Further,
product recalls made by firms with higher corporate product reliability exert a negative spillover
on the competitor’s market value in the event of the competitor’s new product pre-announcement
after the recall. This effect is attenuated by the strength of the competitor’s corporate product
reliability.
In Essay 2, I examine the pattern of frequent product recalls on firm reputation. I identify five
characteristics of product recall pattern: recall frequency (number of product recalls), recall
volume (number of recalled items), recall recency (timing of the latest product recall), recall pace
(speed of product recall timing), and recall clumpiness (lack of consistency of product recall
timing). Results reveal that recalling firm’s reputation is hurt by recall frequency and recall
volume. In addition, the results show that recalling firms need to announce their product recalls

v

closely but avoid announcing clustered product recalls during a calendar year. The findings from
both essays deepen our understanding of product recalls and help practitioners manage product
recalls.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Product recalls are ubiquitous in the marketplace. The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) reveals that 2015 witnessed a 60% rise from 2014 (from 94 to 150) in the
number of food recalls (USDA 2016). Automakers recalled about 2.1 million more vehicles in
2016 than in 2015, setting a record of 927 recall campaigns worldwide (Shepardson 2017). More
frequent product recalls are expected due to the increasing complexity of products, more
stringent product-safety laws, and the growing globalization of business (Dawar and Pillutla
2000; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009).
Scholars have investigated product recalls over the last two decades and found that product
recalls can reduce market share, hurt firm value, and damage brand equity (Chen, Lin, and
Chang 2009; Cleeren, Dekimpe, and van Heerde 2017). In 2009, for example, Toyota’s massive
“unintended acceleration” led to about a 20% percent drop ($35 billion) in Toyota’s overall sales
(Brauer 2014). Volkswagen’s notorious diesel recall caused its stock price to fall 43% (from
$162.30 to $92.36) in one month. Although scholars have paid tremendous attention to product
recalls, the existing literature still presents two research gaps.
The first research gap is the lack of research examining the spillover effect of product recalls
on the market value of recalling firm’s competitors. Prior researchers agree that product recalls
hurt the recalling firm’s market value (e.g. Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Gao et al. 2015; Jarrell
and Peltzman 1985; Liu, Shankar, and Yun 2017). Gao et al. (2015) show that on average
recalling firms lose 0.89% of their market value over two days following a product recall.
1

However, less attention has been paid to the spillover effect of product recalls on the market
value of competitors in the same industry. For example, how do Toyota’s recalls affect the
market value of its competitors, like Honda, Nissan, and Ford? After reviewing the existing
literature, Cleeren, Dekimpe, and van Heerde (2017, p. 607) conclude that “although several
studies have indicated that the effect of a product-harm crisis may spill over to other, nonaffected brands, less is known about the impact of the crisis on competitors.” To the best of my
knowledge, only two studies have empirically examined the spillover effect on competitors’
market value, but their findings are mixed. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find that competitors’
market value suffers from product recalls in the automobile industry. However, results from
Barber and Darrough (1996) reveal a non-significant spillover effect. Therefore, it is still unclear
about the spillover effect of product recalls on the market value of competitors. Studying the
spillover effect is very important because stakeholder theory suggests that a firm’s action can
influence its competitors (Hult et al. 2011). Managers are also interested in whether and how
their firms’ market value is influenced by product recalls from other firms in the industry.
Moreover, to create competitive advantages, firms usually pre-announce their new products
before introducing the new products, that is, new product pre-announcements (NPPAs).
Managers from competitors might think that product recalls might be a good opportunity for
them to capture the recalling firm’s consumers by pre-announcing their new products.
Researchers suggest that firms pre-announce their new products as a signaling strategy to help
successfully launch new products (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988; Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca
2017). For example, Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) find that NPPAs generate positive
market value when firms provide specific new product information. However, none of prior
studies has paid attention to the spillover effect of product recalls on the market value of non-
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recalling firm’s NPPAs after product recalls. Studying product recalls and NPPAs together can
not only help scholars understand the effect of product recalls on NPPAs but also help managers
make a better decision about when to pre-announce new products.
The second research gap is the lack of research investigating the long-term (i.e., annual)
effect of product recalls on the recalling firm’s reputation. Prior studies mainly use lab
experiments to investigate how consumers react to product recalls. Results from lab experiments
indicate consumers’ short-term responses to product recalls, such as brand purchase (Dawar and
Pillutla 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013) and brand perception (Klein and Dawar
2004; Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012). Product recalls are events to firms and have both
short-term and long-term effects on the recalling firm. Recently, Liu, Shankar, and Yun (2017)
investigated investors’ long-term response to product recalls, finding that product recalls hurt the
recalling firm’s market value in the following twelve months. How do product recalls affect
consumers’ long-term responses to the recalling firm? The existing literature has not provided a
clear answer to this question.
In addition, firms recall their products multiple times in a year. In 2018, for example, Ford
recalled a total of 3.75 million of its vehicles three times (in March, April, and September). The
repeated recalls involve recall volume (number of units recalled), recall frequency (number of
product recalls), and recall timing (time of product recalls). In the example of Ford, the recall
volume is 3.75 million, the recalling frequency is three, and the recall timing includes March,
April and September. Prior studies indicate that recall volume can motivate recalling firms to
improve their product reliability, thus reducing the future number of injuries and recalls
(Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). However, the existing literature has not directly
examined how recall volume, recall frequency, and recall timing affect consumers’ long-term
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responses to the recalling firm. Studying the effect responds to the research call from Cleeren et
al. (2017, p.595) that “do more frequent product recalls in the industry attenuate or amplify the
reaction of consumers?” and also helps managers understand how their repeated recalls affect
consumers’ responses to them.
My dissertation aims to fill the above research gaps by investigating the spillover effect of
product recalls on the market value of competitors (Essay 1) and by examining the long-term
effect of frequent product recalls on the recalling firm’s reputation (Essay 2). In Essay 1, using
data from the US automobile industry, I investigate the effect of product recalls on the market
value of competitors at two different times: (1) around the product recall date and (2) around the
competitor’s new product pre-announcement in the wake of the product recall. Drawing on
attribution theory, I hypothesize that product recalls have a negative spillover effect on
competitors’ market value when the recalling firm has high corporate product reliability, and the
negative spillover effect is weakened when the competitor’s corporate product reliability is high.
I also hypothesize that the negative spillover effect will occur to the competitor’s new product
pre-announcement following the product recall. To test my hypothesis, I combine data from
multiple sources such as National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Consumer
reports, Compustat, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
In Essay 2, I investigate how frequent product recalls affect the recalling firm’s reputation in
the long term. The temporal length of the long term here refers to at least one year. A product
recall pattern arises when firms repeatedly announce product recalls. In this essay, I identify five
features of the product recall pattern: recall frequency, recall volume, recall recency, recall pace,
and recall clumpiness. The last three features are related to recall timing. By using attribution
theory, I hypothesize that the five features affect the recalling firm reputation differently.

4

NHTSA provides data about the features of the product recall pattern. Data about firm reputation
will be provided by the Corebrand Index, which has tracked firm reputation for over 800
companies across 49 industries over the last twenty years. I employ vector autoregression (VAR)
to test my hypothesis.

5

CHAPTER II
THE SPILLOVER EFFECT OF PRODUCT RECALLS ON COMPETITORS’ MARKET
VALUE: THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PRODUCT RELIABILITY
Introduction
Companies announce product recalls when their products could harm consumers or fail to
meet an industry standard. In September 2016, for example, Samsung recalled its Galaxy Note 7
due to a defect in its phone’s battery. In November 2009, Toyota recalled its vehicles due to the
brake failure. Prior studies have found that product recalls hurt the recalling firm’s market value,
which is measured by abnormal returns in the stock market (Barber & Darrough, 1996; Chen,
Ganesan, & Liu, 2009; Eilert, Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Swartz, 2017; Gao, Xie, Wang, &
Wilbur, 2015; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Liu, Shankar, & Yun, 2017). For example, Gao et al.
(2015) find that firms earn negative abnormal returns (i.e., -.54%) when announcing product
recalls. Liu, Shankar, and Yun (2017) find that in the automobile industry high recall volume
damages market value of recalling firms within a few days after product recalls (i.e., the shortterm effect) and one year later (i.e., the long-term effect).
However, less is known about the spillover effect of product recalls on the market value of
competitors in the same product category. Spillover effects occur when a product recall affects
beliefs related to competitors that are not involved in the product recall (Ahluwalia, Unnava, and
Burnkrant 2001). For example, when Toyota recalls its products, how does the recall affect
market value of its competitors, such as Honda, Ford, and Nissan? After reviewing the existing
literature, Cleeren, Dekimpe, and van Heerde (2017, p. 607) conclude: “although several studies
6

have indicated that the effect of a product-harm crisis may spill over to other, non-affected
brands, less is known about the impact of the crisis on competitors.” Investigating the spillover
effect is very important because the effect could be either positive or negative. The spillover
effect could be positive because investors might expect that the recalling firm’s consumers
switch to its competitors, which increases the future cash flow of its competitors. For example,
Apple’s stock price rose by 1.90% when Samsung recalled its exploding smartphone—Galaxy
Note 7 (Leswing 2016). However, the literature indicates the spillover effect could be negative
since product recalls might hurt the entire industry. After analyzing product recalls from 1967 to
1981 in the automobile industry, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that competitors’ market
value suffers from product recalls in the automobile industry. In addition, Barber and Darrough
(1996) did not find a spillover effect of product recalls on competitors’ market value when
analyzing product recalls from 1973 to 1992 in the automobile industry. To the best of my
knowledge, only these two studies have empirically examined the spillover effect of product
recalls on competitors’ market value. The mixed evidence from limited studies suggests more
efforts on examining boundary conditions moderating the effect of product recalls on
competitors’ market value.
In this essay, I maintain that one reason for the mixed results is that these prior studies did
not control for the recalling firm’s corporate product reliability (CPR), which refers to a firm’s
reputation for providing dependable products (Eilert et al. 2017). Barber and Darrough (1996)
studied recalls from six automakers: Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler. Since product reliability varies among different firms, the number of recalling firms
could increase the variance in product reliability, which might disguise the spillover effect. Thus,
the non-significant spillover effect in Barber and Darrough (1996) might arise from a diversity of
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product reliability among the six companies. Firms with higher CPR are expected to supply the
market with higher-quality products, which are less likely to be recalled. Hence, when a highCPR firm recalls its products, this could cause investors to lose their confidence in the quality of
products industrywide. In other words, product recalls from a high-CPR firm could shake
investors’ confidence in competitors’ product quality and change their expectations of
competitors’ future cash flow (Sorescu, Warren, & Ertekin, 2017). Thus, the higher CPR of the
recalling firm, the lower market value of a competitor, that is, negative spillover effect.
The negative spillover effect might also carry over to a competitor’s new product preannouncement (NPPA) after the product recall. NPPA refers to a formal and deliberate
communication from a firm before the introduction of a new product (Sorescu, Shankar, &
Kushwaha, 2007; Wu, Balasubramanian, & Mahajan, 2004). For example, two weeks after
Samsung’s recall on September 2nd, 2016, Apple announced its plan to launch iPhone 7. Because
Samsung is known for producing high reliable smartphones, its recall might cause investors to
doubt the quality of the coming new iPhone—iPhone 7 because they expect iPhone 7 would
explode like Samsung’s recalled smartphone (Epstein 2016). The announcement of iPhone 7 is a
new product pre-announcement (NPPA) after Samsung’s recall. So, Samsung’s recall might
affect investors’ reactions to Apple’s NPPA for iPhone 7. I argue that negative spillover effect
occurs when products are recalled by a firm with high CPR. Further, I am interested in
examining whether the negative spillover effect around a product recall could occur when a
competitor makes an NPPA shortly after the product recall.
NPPAs may or may not result in a new product release subsequently, but they are regarded as
a positive event because it signals product innovation (Sorescu et al., 2007). Whereas product
recalls indicate defects in product quality, product innovation helps increase the market
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perception of product quality because new products create more value for the market (Mizik and
Jacobson 2003). However, when investors lose their confidence in a competitor’s product
quality, they might doubt the quality of new products pre-announced by the competitor. This
could affect how positively they receive the news of an NPPA. Thus, the negative spillover
effect could extend to the moment when a competitor makes an NPPA directly after a product
recall. Although prior studies have extensively examined product recalls and NPPAs, they
investigate the two events separately without considering the impact of product recalls on
NPPAs afterwards.
The literature suggests that a competitor with higher CPR suffers more from the recall by a
firm with higher CPR since both have similar CPR (Borah and Tellis 2016; Roehm and Tybout
2006). However, investors should lose less confidence in products from a competitor with high
CPR than with low CPR. Thus, compared to a competitor with low CPR, a competitor with high
CPR would suffer less from a recall by a firm with high CPR. Due to the conflicting conclusions,
this essay will empirically investigate how a competitor’s CPR moderates the spillover effect of
product recalls on the competitor’s market value.
The objective of this essay is to investigate how CPR affects the spillover effect of product
recalls on a competitor’s market value around a product recall and around the competitor’s
NPPA directly after the recall. This essay will contribute to the literature in three ways. First, this
essay enriches the literature by examining the spillover effect of product recalls on competitors’
market value. Prior studies mainly investigate how product recalls affect consumers’ intention to
purchase competitors’ products (Roehm and Tybout 2006; Trump and Newman 2017) and online
chatter about competitors’ products (Borah and Tellis 2016). Instead, this essay investigates
investors’ responses to product recalls and focuses on how product recalls affect competitors’
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market value in the stock market. Second, this essay provides a better understanding of the effect
of product reliability on competitors. Prior studies mainly concentrate on the impact of product
reliability on the recalling firm, and have found that a recalling firm’s high product reliability can
damage its sales because product recalls violate consumers’ expectations of high product quality
(Rhee and Haunschild 2006; Liu and Shankar 2015). Recently, Topaloglu and Gokalp (2018)
reached a similar conclusion by analyzing data from the United States auto industry. However,
this essay examines the impact of product reliability on market value of the recalling firm’s
competitors. Third, this essay extends the spillover effect of product recalls on a competitor’s
market value from the moment of a product recall to the moment of the competitor’s NPPA
directly after the product recall.

Literature review: the spillover effect of product recalls
Spillover effects occur when information affects beliefs related to objects that are not
involved in the information (Ahluwalia, Unnava, and Burnkrant 2001). Objects here can be
product attributes, products, brands, and countries. In the context of product recalls, prior studies
have investigated spillovers from one attribute to another attribute of the same brand (e.g.,
Ahluwalia et al., 2001), from one product to another within a brand family (e.g., Balachander &
Ghose, 2003; Lei, Dawar, & Lemmink, 2008), from one brand to another brand in the same
product category (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016; Roehm and Tybout 2006; Zhou et al. 2019), and
from one product category to another one (e.g., Erdem & Sun, 2002). For example, Ahluwalia,
Unnava, and Burnkrant (2001) suggest that when consumers are not familiar with the recalled
brand, negative information about one attribute (e.g. comfort of shoes) can spill over to another
attribute (e.g. durability of shoes) that is not involved in the negative information. Lei, Dawar,
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and Lemmink (2008) indicate that product recalls about a sub-brand (e.g. Tide) can negatively
spill over to its parent brand (P&G) when the association between the sub-brand and its parent
brand is strong. Liu and Shankar (2015) show that product recalls from one sub-brand can reduce
the sales of other sub-brands under the same parent brand. This stream of literature mainly
examines the spillover effect on another object within the recalling company rather than the
spillover effect over the recalling company’s competitors. Since the focus of this essay is on the
latter, I am going to mainly review the literature on the competitive spillover effect.
Regarding the spillover effect across competing corporate brands in the same product
category, the existing literature about product recalls presents mixed evidence of the spillover
effect. Some scholars conclude that competitors are immune from product recalls. After
analyzing a five-year panel data from grocery stores, Mackalski and Belisle (2015) found that the
Land O’Lakes butter recall in 2003 mainly damaged other Land O’Lakes’ product categories,
had a limited influence on private label brands, and did not spill over to competing corporate
brands. Sullivan (1990) reached a similar conclusion that the sudden acceleration problem of the
Audi 5000 caused a decline in sales of other Audi’s brands, but did not affect sales of MercedesBenz.
However, scholars contend that the spillover effect occurs when Brand A and Brand B are
similar (Janakiraman, Sismeiro, and Dutta 2009; Mackalski and Belisle 2015; Roehm and
Tybout 2006; Trump and Newman 2017). After analyzing a panel data about the antidepressant
therapeutic market, Janakiraman et al. (2009) found that the quality perception of an existing
brand can serve as an indicator to help develop the quality perception of a new brand only when
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on Brand Spillover
Authors

Zhou et al.
(2019)

Maher and
Singhapakdi
(2017)

Trump and
Newman
(2017)

Borah and
Tellis (2016)

Event

Product
recall

Productharm crisis

Brand
Scandal

Product
recall

Industry

Automotive

Computer
and
Automotive

Shoes and
Automotive

Automotive

Method

Quasi
experiments

Spillover
effect

Sample

Main findings

Sales

33 car models
in the United
States from
2000 to 2012

Competitors' promotions after a product
recall do not significantly affect their sales
on average. However, about 86% of
premium brands can benefit from
promotional reactions.

Experiment

Purchase
intention

The moral failure of a foreign brand
reduces consumers' intention to purchase a
561 participants
competing brand from the same foreign
for 2
country but increases the intention to
experiments
purchase a competing brand from the local
country.

Experiment

Liking and
purchase
intention

Unethical spillover effect occurs when
381 participants
competing brands are similar to the
for 2
involved brand and when consumers focus
experiments
on details of the unethical brand.

Empirical

Negative
chatter and
abnormal
stock
returns

500 samples of
online chatter
from 2009 to
2010
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Perverse halo exists. Perverse halo effects
are stronger (1) when brands from the
same country and (2) from a dominant
brand to a less dominant brand.

Table 1. Summary of the Literature on Brand Spillover (Continued)

Allen et al.
(2015)

Mackalski
and Belisle
(2015)

Seo et al.
(2014)

Service
failure

Airline,
hotel, and
restaurant

Product
recall

Consumer
packaged
goods (Land
O'Lakes
butter)

Food crises

Magnusson et Product
al. (2014)
recall

Cleeren, van
Heerde, and
Dekimpe
(2013)

Product
harm crisis

restaurant

Automotive

Consumer
good
product

Experiment

Empirical

Empirical

Experiment

Empirical

Satisfaction 519 subjects
and word of from 3
mouth
experiments

Sales

Abnormal
stock return

Brand
attitude

Category
purchases
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External recovery efforts help the
recovering firm gain more satisfied and
loyal consumers only when the recovering
firm is not affiliated with the falling firm.

30 product
categories from
2001 to 2005 in
47 states in the
U.S.

Negative spillover occurs within the same
brand industry and to private label brands,
but does not spread to competing brands.

73 food crises
from 1994 to
2010

The negative relationship between
abnormal returns of Jack in the Box and
other firm's food crises is stronger when
the crisis is closer to its 1993 Escherichia
Coli crisis.

The effect of Prototype brand crisis on
consumer's attitude toward same-country
539 participants
brands is mediated by the country image
and is moderated by country development.
60 major
product recalls
in the United
Kingdom and
Netherlands
from 2000 to
2007

When there is a higher level of negative
publicity, brand (category) advertising has
more positive effect on brand (category)
share. The brand acknowledged blame
undermines the effect of brand (category)
advertising on brand (category) share.

Table 1. Summary of the Literature on Brand Spillover (Continued)
Zhao, Zhao,
and Helsen
(2011)

Product
harm crisis

Consumer
packaged
goods

Janakiraman,
New Product
Sismeiro, and
healthcare
Introduction
Dutta (2009)

Lei, Dawar,
Product
and Lemmink
harm crisis
(2008)

Roehm and
Tybout
(2006)

Dahlén and
Lange (2006)

Misleading
consumers;
Water
pollution

Brand
scandal

Consumer
packaged
goods

Restaurant;
athletic
shoes

Bank

Brand
purchases

Kraft's peanut
butter product
recall in June
1996.

Consumers are more sensitive to product
quality in the product category, but are less
sensitive to advertising and price.
Competing brands can benefit from a
product-harm crisis in the product
category.

Empirical

Quality
perception

11,233
prescriptions by
125 physicians
from 1988 to
1992

The perception spillovers across brands
can happen when the brands are highly
similar. The perception of new product can
be developed by the perceptions of the
existing competing brands.

Experiment

Brand
evaluation

185/48/132
participants in
various
experiments

The magnitude of spillover between brands
is determined by the strength and
directionality of brand associations.

Brand
attitude

81 MBA
students
(experiment 1);
54 MBA
students
(experiment 2);
66 students
(experiment 3)

A scandal is likely to spill over when the
scandalized company is typical of the
category and the scandal relates to an
attribute with a high associate within the
category. When a competitor is similar to a
scandalized brand on the scandal attribute,
the scandal is more likely to spill over to
the competitor.

Empirical

Experiment

Experiment

Brand
evaluation
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A brand crisis affects the evaluation of
category attributes and negatively
100 participants
(positively) influences evaluations of
similar (dissimilar) brands.

the two brands are similar. Borah and Tellis (2016) have found that individuals tend to chat more
negatively on social media about competing corporate brands from the same country as the
recalled brand. Trump and Newman (2017) found that when one brand has an ethical problem,
the competing corporate brand similar to the brand is also perceived to have the ethical problem.
In addition, other scholars argue that the spillover effect depends on competitors’ reactions. Bala,
Bhardwaj, and Chintagunta (2017) apply analytical modeling to product recalls in the
pharmacedutical industry and conclude that a competitor’s sales effort allocation strategy in the
wake of a recall depends on recall probability and economies of scope across categories.
Recently, Zhou and her colleagues (2019) examine competitors’ promotional responses to 20092010 Toyota’s recalls, and find 50% of premium competing brands intensified promotions and
86% of them had increased sales from the promotions, and non-premium competing brands
could not benefit from their promotions. This stream of literature focuses on the spillover effect
over competitor’s sales, that is, consumers’ reactions to competitors. Since consumers’ reactions
could influence competitors’ future cash flow, thus affecting competitors’ market value.
Although prior studies have investigated the spillover effect on the stock market’s reaction to
the recalling firm’s competitor in the same category, their results are not consistent. After
analyzing product recalls from American and Japanese automakers from 1973 to 1992, Barber
and Darrough (1996) showed that product recalls have no significant spillover effect on the stock
market reaction. However, after analyzing product recalls from 1967 to 1981 in the automobile
industry, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that competitors lost their value in the stock market
when product recalls occur in the automobile industry. The inconsistent findings indicate the
need to investigate the boundary condition under which product recalls affect competitors’
market value. Unlike the majority of prior studies, this research investigates the investors’
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reactions to competitors around product recalls and examines some boundary conditions
influencing their reactions. Moreover, prior studies mainly focus on one firm event—product
recall. I will also investigate investors’ reactions to competitors’ NPPA in the wake of prdouct
recalls.

Theoretical foundation and hypothesis development
Attribution theory
Human tends to assign causes to an unexpected event. Attribution theory explains how
individuals interpret events and answer why a certain behavior or event happens. Product recall
is a product-harm crisis that involves defective or dangerous products. When a product recall
occurs, individuals spontaneously seek attributions of blame for the product recall or harmful
products (Klein and Dawar 2004). Weiner's (1985) attribution model identifies three causal
dimensions of attributions that result in an overall judgement of blame: locus of causality,
stability, and controllability. The first dimension is the locus of causality, which means whether
or not the cause of an event is internal or external to a firm. Individuals tend to blame the firm
for the event if the cause is internal to it, like poor internal quality management. However,
individuals attribute a recall to other factors than a firm if the cause is external, like a supplier’s
issue. Stability, the second dimension, is about an event is perceived as stable or temporary.
Individuals usually do not blame a firm if they perceive the event as a temporary incident.
However, they tend to attribute the event to a firm if it seems stable. The last dimension is
controllability, which means whether the event happens within or outside the control of a firm. If
individuals perceive that a firm should have prevented an event, they tend to blame the firm for
the event; otherwise, they will forgive the firm. This essay will focus on the locus of causality,
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arguing that investors are less likely to blame a recalling firm when they attribute a recall to
some factors industrywide, which can also cause other firms to recall their products in the future.

The effect of a recalling firm’s CPR
Higher reliability of a firm’s product indicates higher expectation of the firm’s product
quality and lower expectation of the firm’s product recalls. When a high-CPR firm recalls its
products, investors could be surprised because the firm should be the last one recalling its
products in the industry. To find a reason for the firm’s product recall, investors tend to attribute
the product recall to some factors out of the firm’s control or outside of the firm, like the
immaturity of technology. The product recall could shake investors’ confidence in products
across the whole industry, believing other firms in the industry are also likely to recall their
products in the future. Thus, if a firm with higher CPR has recalled its products, competitors in
the industry are seen as also more likely to recall their products in the future and investors lose
their confidence in the product quality across the entire industry (Borah and Tellis 2016; Roehm
and Tybout 2006). Conversely, since products from a firm with low CPR are expected to have
quality problems, investors are likely to attribute the product recall to the recalling firm.
Therefore, compared to recalls from low-CPR firms, recalls from high-CPR firms would have a
stronger effect on investor’s belief that competitors would have similar product safety issues or
recall their products in the future.
Accordingly, I hypothesize:
H1: The higher a recalling firm’s corporate product reliability, the lower a competitor’s
market value around the event of a product recall.
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The insulating effect of a competitor’s CPR
I argue that a competitor’s CPR can mitigate the negative effect of a recalling firm’s CPR on
the competitor’s market value. When a product recall occurs in the industry, individuals become
more sensitive to product quality (Zhao, Zhao, and Helsen 2011). However, a competitor’s
reputation for high product quality can help it offset the negative spillover effect (Hsu and
Lawrence 2016) since a competitor with high CPR is less expected to recall its products than a
competitor with low CPR. Anderson and Sullivan (1993) find empirical evidence that firms with
higher customer satisfaction and reputation are more insulated from customer defections when
product failures occur. Prior studies have found a positive effect of customer satisfaction on
stock market returns (Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 2004; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006).
Therefore, while product recalls from firms with higher CPR can reduce investors’ perceived
quality of competitors’ products (H1), the higher CPR of competitors may insulate them from the
negative spillover effect than those with lower CPR. Accordingly, I hypothesize:
H2: A competitor’s corporate product reliability attenuates the negative spillover effect of a
recalling firm’s corporate product reliability on the competitor’s market value around the event
of the product recall.

Competitor’s new product pre-announcement after a product recall
An NPPA is a formal announcement delivered before the introduction of new products (e.g.,
Sorescu et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2004). Studies show that NPPAs create value for the launching
firms. For example, Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) suggested that firms should pre-announce
their new products as a signaling strategy to help successfully launch new products. Analyzing
419 NPPAs in the high-tech industry, Sorescu and her colleagues (2007) found that NPPAs
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generate positive abnormal-term stock returns when firms provide specific new product
information. Recently, Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca (2017) showed that the abnormal stock returns
to NPPAs can predict the future performance of new products, finding a positive relationship
between the short-term abnormal returns to NPPAs and subsequent new product performance
(i.e., market share). There is extensive literature on the timing of NPPAs, that is, how far ahead a
firm should pre-announce a new product before the introduction of the new product (Su and Rao
2010). For example, after summarizing prior studies on the NPPA timing, Su and Rao (2010)
identify four types of factors determining NPPA timing decisions: firm-related, customer-related,
industry-related, and new-product-related. By analyzing data from 217 senior marketing
managers, Kohli (1999) find the timing depends on factors related to products. For example, he
suggests that firms should pre-announce their new products earlier when their customers are
required to learn the new product or face high switching costs. After interviewing 50 managers in
40 firms, Lilly and Walters (1997) propose that firms should shorten the timing when the
competitive reaction is more damaging, the new product is less innovative, or the buying process
is longer. Using a game-theoretic theory, Su and Rao (2011) conclude that firms should not preannounce their new products until the pre-announcement can create demands. In addition, Wu,
Balasubramanian, and Mahajan (2004) examine factors influencing the delay in the introduction
of a pre-announced product. More studies on the NPPA timing are presented in Su and Rao
(2010, p. 662). Although researchers have investigated some factors affecting the decision of
NPPA timing, they have not examined whether product recalls can affect abnormal returns to an
ensuing competitor’s NPPA. In this essay, I am going to study how product recalls affect
investors’ reactions to a competitor’s NPPA directly after a product recall.
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Based on the argument in H1, product recalls from high-CPR firms shake investors’
confidence in product quality of competitors in the industry. When a competitor pre-announces
its new products following a product recall, investors might doubt the quality of the new
products, thus reducing the competitor’s market value. In other words, the attribution of product
recalls from high-CPR firms can undermine investors’ belief about the quality of the
competitor’s new products. Since a competitor’s CPR can insulate it from the negative spillover
effect of a product recall (H2), I hypothesize the same moderating effect of a competitor’s CPR
in the context of competitor’s NPPA made directly after the product recall. Accordingly, I
hypothesize:
H3: The higher a recalling firm’s corporate product reliability, the lower a competitor’s
market value when the competitor pre-announces its new products after the product recall.
H4: A competitor’s corporate product reliability attenuates the negative spillover effect of a
recalling firm’s corporate product reliability on the competitor’s market value when the
competitor pre-announces its new products after the product recall.

Research methodology
I tested my hypotheses by using data from the U.S. automobile industry, which is a
significant sector of the economy at nearly 3% of U.S. GDP (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and
Eilert 2013) and has a high frequency of product recalls, thus providing an appropriate sample
size for my research (Borah and Tellis 2016). To test the hypotheses, I employed event study
methodology, which has been widely used in the product recall literature (Chen, Ganesan, and
Liu 2009; Gao et al. 2015). One advantage of event study methodology is that this method allows
“researchers to isolate, in a forward looking manner, the expected value that the firm will derive
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from a corporate action that has just been revealed to the public” (Sorescu, Warren, and Ertekin
2017, p.186). Event study methodology assumes that changes in a stock price reflect new
information available to the market (Sorescu, Warren, and Ertekin 2017). By using event study
methodology, I am able to calculate the change of stock prices due to a product recall or an
NPPA after a product recall. Therefore, I can employ this method to find how product recalls
affect a non-recalling firm’s stock price. Study 1 tests H1 and H2, which relate to the role of
corporate product reliability on a competitor’s market value around the date of a product recall
announcement. Study 2 tests H3 and H4, which are about whether the negative spillover effect
on a competitor’s market value could extend to the competitor’s NPPA directly after a product
recall.

Study 1
Data collection
In Study 1, I assembled the data from various sources. NHTSA (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration) provides data about product recall characteristics, such as the
announcement date, product harm severity, and the recall volume. LexisNexis and Factiva
provide data about the announcement date, and media coverage. Consumer Reports provides data
about corporate product reliability. Abnormal returns can be calculated from the data provided
by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Table 1 presents a summary of the data
sources and the operationalization of variables in this essay.
I collected data on product recalls from six major automakers—Toyota, Honda, Nissan,
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—as these firms make up about 90% of U.S. motor vehicle
sales and have been used in prior studies (e.g., Borah & Tellis, 2016; Gao et al., 2015). As Gao et
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al. (2015) suggest, major recalls have to be determined in relation to firm size. According to Gao
et al. (2015), the thresholds for how many vehicles have to be recalled for it to be a major recall
are as follows: 50,000 for Toyota, 40,000 for General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler, 30,000
for Honda, and 20,000 for Nissan. I also assume that only major recalls could affect competitors
since they can receive enough attention from the market. I collected product recalls from 2011 to
2016. 39 recalls were excluded since their event windows overlapped with the recalling firm’s
and competitors’ confounding events (i.e., new product announcements, mergers and
acquisitions, earnings information, and recalls from two different firms at the same date). Thus,
this essay ends up with 525 observations.

Measurement
Dependent variables. I used abnormal returns to measure market value and chose a two-day
window to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The two-day window covers the
product recall announcement date and the day after the event date (Liu, Liu, & Luo, 2016). I
chose this window to isolate the effect of the recall, preventing other news from confounding the
results.
The abnormal return (AR) to an event is measured by the difference between the observed
return and the expected return on the event date. In this essay, the abnormal return is calculated
based on the market-adjusted model for short-term stock returns (Sorescu et al., 2017).
(1) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

where ARit is the abnormal return of firm i on day t, Rit is the daily return of firm i on day t,

and Rmt is the return of the stock market index on day t.
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I then calculated CARs by adding the daily abnormal returns during a time window from t1 to
t2 (i.e., a two-day window).
(2) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡1,𝑡𝑡2) = ∑𝑡𝑡2
𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Independent variables. In this paper, brand refers to the make such as Camry, Corolla, and
Fiesta. Eilert et al.(2017) use brand reliability to represent the make-level reliability. However,
since I focus on the firm (i.e., car manufacturer) such as Honda, Toyota, and Ford, and stock
return data is available at the firm level, I term the firm-level reliability as corporate product
reliability (CPR). I computed CPR from Consumer Reports, which provides the reliability score
of each brand’s model. To get the measurement of product reliability at the firm level, I averaged
the scores of all brand’s models under one firm in the previous three years (Eilert et al. 2017;
Rhee and Haunschild 2006).
Control variables. The control variables in this essay include firm-level financial variables,
recall characteristics, media coverage of past recalls, and the recalling firm’s abnormal returns.
Firm-level financial variables are advertising expenditures, research and development
expenditures, and brand diversification. Table 2 presents the data sources of these control
variables. Recall characteristics include the recall volume, the recalled product harm severity,
and recall frequency. The recall volume is the number of affected product items. The recalled
product harm severity measures how dangerous the recalled products are to consumers. Its value
is “1” if the focal recall is due to major quality defects, such as brake failure, faulty airbags, poor
visibility, steering problems, acceleration problems, or fuel leakage, which can cause fire or car
crash, and is “0” if the focal recall is due to minor quality defects such as equipment, suspension,
seats, and locks (Gao et al. 2015). Recall frequency measures the number of recalls announced
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Table 2.Variables, operationalizations, and data sources in Study 1 and Study 2
Variables

Label

Operationalization

Study Study
Data Source
1
2

Dependent Variable
The competitor’s
cumulative abnormal
returns
The competitor's
cumulative abnormal
returns to its NPPA

The competitor's shortterm abnormal returns to
C_CAR1
the product recall
announcement.
The competitor's shortterm abnormal returns to
C_CAR2
its new product preannouncement.

√

CRSP

√

CRSP

√

√

Consumer
Reports

√

√

Consumer
Reports

√

√

Compustat

Focal Independent
Variables
The recalling firm's
corporate product
reliability

R_CPR

The competitor’s
corporate product
reliability

C_CPR

A five point scale of
problem rates for the
recalling firm (1="most
problems," and 5="fewest
problems")(Rhee and
Haunschild 2006)
A five point scale of
problem rates for the
competitor (1="most
problems," and 5="fewest
problems")(Rhee and
Haunschild 2006)

Control Variables
Recalling firm
advertising

R_Ad

The logarithm of the
recalling firm's advertising
expenditures

Recalling firm R&D

R_RD

The logarithm of recalling
firm's R&D expenditures

√

√

Compustat

Recalling firm brand
diversification

R_BD

The number of the
recalling firm's brands

√

√

Consumer
Reports

Competitor
advertising

C_Ad

The logarithm of the
competitor's advertising
expenditures

√

√

Compustat

Competitor R&D

C_RD

The logarithm of
competitor's R&D
expenditures

√

√

Compustat

Competitor brand
diversification

C_BD

The number of the
competitor's brands

√

√

Consumer
Reports
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Table 3.Variables, operationalizations, and data sources in Study 1 and Study 2
(Contiunued)
Year Trend

Yr

The recalling firm's
recall frequency

R_Frq

The competitor’s
recall frequency

C_Frq

The current recall
volume

Vlm

The current recalled
product harm
severity

Hzd

The publicity
coverage on the
competitor's recalls

C_Pub

The publicity
coverage on the
recalling firm's
recalls

R_Pub

The social media
coverage

SMC

Country of origin

Ctry

Recalling firm
NPPA history

R_H

Competitor NPPA
history

C_H

Product
innovativeness

Inv

The number of years
between the initial year in
the sample and the year
when the recall occurred
The number of recalls
from the recalling firm in
the three months prior to
the current recall
The number of recalls
from the competitor in the
three months prior to the
current recall
The logarithm of the total
number of products
affected by the current
recall
Whether the current recall
is caused by a major safety
hazard (1) or not (0)
The number of articles
about the competitor’s past
recalls between the
previous recall and the
current recall
The number of articles
about the recalling firm’s
past recalls between the
previous recall and the
current recall
The number of blog posts
about the current recall
Whether the recalling firm
and the competitor are
from the same country (1)
or not (0)
The number of the
recalling firm's NPPA
during the twelve months
before an NPPA
The number of the
competitor's NPPA during
the twelve months before
an NPPA
A five -point scale
measuring the newness of
the product in an NPPA.
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√

√

NHTSA

√

√

NHTSA

√

√

NHTSA

√

√

NHTSA

√

√

NHTSA

√

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

√

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

√

√

LexisNexis

√

√

NHTSA

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

√

Talay,
Akdeniz, and
Kirca (2017)

Table 4.Variables, operationalizations, and data sources in Study 1 and Study 2
(Continued)
NPPA specificity

Spc

NPPA credibility

Crd

Months to launch

Mth

Days between recall
and NPPA

Days

The number of
characteristics of the new
product in an NPPA
A four-point scale
measuring the probability
of the new product
introduction to the market.
The number of months
between the preannouncement date and
the planned launch date.
The number of days
between a product recall
and its following NPPA

√

Talay,
Akdeniz, and
Kirca (2017)

√

Sorescu et al.
(2007)

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

√

LexisNexis/F
activa

by the recalling firm during the three months before the focal recall. Borah and Tellis (2016) find
that when the competitor and the recalling firm are from the same country, the spillover effect of
online chatter on product recalls to the competitor is stronger. Therefore, I additionally
controlled for country of origin (i.e., the home country of an auto manufacturer)(Borah and Tellis
2016).
Media coverage plays an important role in the information dissemination. The literature has
found that media coverage influences the market reaction to product recalls (Cleeren, van
Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). Consistent with Liu, Shankar, and Yun (2017), this essay controls
for the coverage from social media, like blogs, and conventional media, such as newspapers and
magazines. Conventional media coverage is measured by the number of news articles about the
current recalling firm’s recalls during the latest two recalls. Social media coverage is measured
as the number of blog posts about the current product recall due to the short-term influence of
social media on the competitor’s abnormal returns (Borah and Tellis 2016). Finally, to capture
the potential impact of time trend, this essay also includes a time variable—year trend (Chen et
al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017). I control for firm specific effects by creating dummy variables for
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each firm, that is, firm-fixed effects. Table 3 shows the summary statistics and correlations
matrix of all variables.
To ensure that the results are not influenced by outliers, I calculated the Cook’s distance
(Cook 1977). The maximum is 0.109, which is below the cut-off point of 1, indicating no outliers
in the data.

Research model
(3) 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝚼𝚼 𝑇𝑇 𝐙𝐙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Where 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a competitor j’s cumulative abnormal returns for product recall k by firm i;
𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the recalling firm i’s corporate product reliability at the time of product recall k;

𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is competitor j’s corporate product reliability when firm i announces product recall k;

𝐙𝐙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a vector of control variables when firm i announces product recall k; 𝚼𝚼 𝑇𝑇 is a vector of

parameters (𝛾𝛾1 , … 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 ), where n is the number of control variables; and ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term. 𝛽𝛽0,
𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3, and Υ are parameters to be estimated. The various control variables employed in

equation (3) are reported in Table 2.

Because one recall influences the market value of multiple competitors, the market value of
various competitors could be linked together by the particular recall common to them all. Thus,
equation (3) could suffer from contemporaneous correlations between competitors’ error terms
for a given recall. Hence, I used clustered standard errors to account for within-cluster
correlations in the model estimation (Eilert et al. 2017).
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Table 5. Correlations, means and standard deviation (Study 1)

1.C_CAR1
2.R_CPR
3.C_CPR
4.R_AD
5.R_RD
6.R_BD
7.C_AD
8.C_RD
9.C_BD
10.R_Frq
11.C_Frq
12.Hzd
13.Vlm
14.R_Pub
15.C_Pub

1
1

2

.028

1

-.098*

-.157**

1

.014

-.020

-.075

1

.002

-.096*

.342**

.673**

1

-.048

.149**

.666**

.339**

1

-.092*

-.123**

1

-.013

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.000

-.012

-.010

-.155**

.028

.489**

-.088*

-.120**

-.103*

-.106*

.797**

1

-.022

.184**

-.038

-.114**

-.057

-.178**

.771**

.743**

1

.061

.003

.076

.090*

.098*

.160**

-.007

-.021

-.031

1

-.039

.117**

-.154**

.009

.017

.028

-.070

1

-.098*

.011

.021

.019

-.008

.134**

1

-.003

.028

.039

13

14

15

16

-.095*

-.005

-.031

.012

.124**

.014

-.033

.088*

.071

.240**

-.196**

.002

.017

.037

-.074

.060

.366**

1

.037

.015

-.210**

.286**

.175**

.166**

-.038

-.037

-.023

.233**

-.144**

.066

-.027

1

.002

.217**

.158**

.123**

-.068

-.105*

-.038

-.009

.078

1

.116**

.137**

.270**

-.036

.258**

1

.011

-.028

-.037

.039

-.036
.246**

.060

-.029

-.037

-.006

.159**

17

18

.009

-.005

-.026

.224**

.006

-.028

-.019

.006

-.010

-.016

.000

.014

.045

.022

.018

-.020

-.002

-.014

.008

.016

1

.040

-.041

-.129**

.229**

.240**

.100*

.089*

.094*

-.014

.032

.082

.058

.274**

.050

.091*

.134**

.000

1

Mean

.011

3.274

3.308

3.517

5.839

13.98

3.516

3.751

12.97

3.09

3.5

.34

5.41

2.45

3.71

3.27

.17

3.5

S.D.

.024

1.01

.948

.132

.141

5.008

.141

.176

5.555

2.03

2.172

.475

.571

4.255

8.585

5.62

.372

1.658

16.SMC
17.Ctry
18.Yr

** P<.01; * P<.05; S.D.= Standard Deviation
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Results
To test my hypotheses, I estimated equation (3) in Stata 15 and presented the results in Table
4. The results show that the recalling firm’s CPR has a negative effect on a competitor’s CAR
(β=-0.017, p<.01), supporting H1. The coefficient of the interaction between the recalling firm’s
CPR and its competitor’s CPR is significantly positive (β=0.003, p<.01).I calculated the
high/low level of the competitor’s CPR as one standard deviation above/below its mean. Fig.1.
reveals that the negative effect of the recalling firm’s CPR on the competitor’s CAR is stronger
when the competitor’s CPR is low rather than when it is high, supporting H2.

Additional Analysis
First, to ensure that my results are not biased because of the specific asset pricing model to
measure CARs, I also calculated abnormal returns by using Carhart's (1997) four-factor model as
showed in equation (4):
(4) (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
The data for the four factors in equation (4) were collected from the website

(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The abnormal return
is calculated as in equation (5):
(5) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 − [𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽̂1𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 � + 𝛽𝛽̂2𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽̂3𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽̂4𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 ]

Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the stock return for firm i at time t; 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free return at time t; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the

intercept term; 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the market return at time t; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the difference of returns between small
and big stocks at time t; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 is the difference of returns between high and low book-to-market
stocks at time t; 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 is the return momentum at time t, and the residual (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) is the measure of
the firm-idiosyncratic excess return (Cao, Simin, and Zhao 2008; Luo and Bhattacharya 2009).
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Table 6. The competitor’s abnormal returns around the product recall announcement (Study 1)
The Competitor’s CAR
Coefficient
R.S.E.
t-value
Intercept
Focal Independent Variables
The recalling firm's CPR
The competitor’s CPR
The recalling firm's CPR×
The competitor's CPR
Control Variables
Recalling firm advertising
Recalling firm R&D
Recalling firm brand diversification
Competitor advertising
Competitor R&D
Competitor brand diversification
Recalling firm recall frequency
Competitor recall frequency
The recalled product harm severity
The current recall volume
Media coverage on the recalling firm's recall
Media coverage on the competitor's recall
Social media coverage
Country of origin
Year trend
Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
Firm 4
Firm 5
R-square
Number of observations
*
p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01
R.S.E. refers to robust standard error.

-.292

.249

-1.18

-.019***
-.01***

.002
.002

-7.53
-6.60

.003***

.001

4.40

-.003
.055
-.003*
-.005
.017
-4.21E-04*
.002
-.001
-.009**
.004
9.22E-05
1.19E-05
6.73E-05
9.50E-04
-.001
.039
.034
.032*
.042
.053*

.056
.055
.001
.029
.03
1.88E-04
8.30E-04
9.29E-04
.003
.002
4.68E-05
1.16E-04
7.87E-05
.003
.001
.035
.028
.013
.029
.024

-.05
.99
-2.47
-.24
.59
-2.24
1.87
-1.12
-2.60
1.74
1.97
1.03
.86
.24
-1.63
1.04
1.14
2.21
1.40
2.11

.069
525
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The Competitor's CAR

-0.33

Low competitor's CPR

High competitor's CPR

-0.37
Low
High
recalling firm's CPR recalling firm's CPR

Figure 1. The moderating effect of the competitor's CPR in Study 1
𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽̂1𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽̂2𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽̂3𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽̂4𝑖𝑖 in equation (5) are the estimates of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖 in equation
(4), respectively. The results from this measure are similar to those from the market-adjusted
CARs. Especially, the coefficient for the recalling firm’s CPR is -0.013 (p<0.05) and the
coefficient for the interaction is 0.002 (p<0.05).Second, I created the variable of year trend to test
the time effect. Another way to test the time effect is to create dummy variables for different
years. Because using year trend might smooth out some time-variant information, I reran the
model by creating dummy variables for different years. I obtained consistent results (the
recalling firm’s CPR: β=-0.02, p<0.01; the interaction term: β=0.003, p<0.01).
Third, even though two firms are from the same country, they may have different markets
and are not direct competitors. For example, minivan is Chrysler’s major market, but truck is
Ford’s. I used the number of shared car markets (i.e., Sedan, SUV, Truck, Compact, Minivan,
and Sport Cars) to capture the strength of competition. Higher similarity indicates closer
competition between two firms. For example, in 2013, Ford shared two markets (i.e., Sedan and
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Minivan) with Chrysler, but five markets (i.e., Sedan, SUV, Truck, Compact, and Minivan) with
Honda. Compared to Chrysler, Honda is a closer competitor to Ford. When Ford has a recall, its
recall influences Honda more than Chrysler due to the closer competition relationship. I use the
number of shared auto markets to capture the competition strength between two firms. My
results show that the similarity in the market does not negatively affect the competitor’s market
value (β=-0.0002, p =0.852), and support H1 (the recalling firm’s CPR: β=-0.019, p<0.01) and
H2 (the interaction term: β=0.003, p<0.01).
Fourth, Gao et al. (2015) indicate product newness might influence investors’ reactions. The
value of product newness is decoded as “1” if the recall involves new products that where were
released within two years, otherwise, the value is “0.” I adopted this measure of product newness
and added it as an additional control variable. Results show that product newness does not
significantly affect the spillover effect (β =-0.0038, p = 0.238).
Finally, the recalls that influence the market value of competitors are unpredictable and thus
exogenous to competitor’s CARs. Also, since CPR measures are captured prior to the recall, they
are exogenous to competitor’s CARs too. However, it is possible that some variables that
influence competitor’s CARs are correlated with competitor’s CPR, which could bias the
estimates (i.e., 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 ) of equation (3). For example, competitor’s innovation capability

could influence their CARs while also being correlated with their CPR. To account for the

endogeneity induced by omitted variables, I used the average number of product recalls and the
average number of product items recalled by the recalling firm in the previous three years as
instruments for the recalling firm’s CPR. The rationale for the instruments is as follows: the
firm’s CPR is correlated with the number of product recalls (or number of recalled items) in that
the higher the number, the lower a firm’s CPR. However, these two instruments are independent

32

of a firm’s CARs, since the information is from the past three years and has already been
factored into the stock price. Thus, these instruments are not correlated with the stock market’s
reactions to the current recall. Similar instruments were constructed for competitor’s CPR.
I used the control function approach to test endogeneity since interaction terms are involved
in equation (3) (Rutz and Watson 2019). Results from the control function approach support H1
(the recalling firm’s CPR: β=-0.015, p<0.05) and H2 (the interaction term: β=0.003, p<0.01).
Thus, my results are robust.

Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 is to investigate whether the negative spillover effect extends to the
market value of a competitor’s NPPA.

Data collection
Study 2 examines two events—product recall and NPPA, in tandem. Based on Study 1, I
identified the pre-announcement event by searching Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for all articles
containing words “launch,” “announce,” and “introduce.” This approach has been applied in
Sorescu et al. (2007) and Talay et al. (2017). An NPPA can follow another NPPA or a product
recall. Because I are only interested in the NPPA after another firm’s product recall, I identified
107 NPPAs following a product recall by another firm within the industry.

Measurements
I collected data about abnormal returns and CPR as in Study 1. In addition to control
variables in Study 1, others include the characteristics of the announcing firms and NPPAs.
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Table 2 presents these variables. Characteristics of the recalling firm and the competitor include
advertising expenditures, research and development expenditures, and brand diversification. In
addition, I also added some variables related to NPPAs. Warren and Sorescu (2017) recommend
that investors’ reactions to a firm’s NPPA should be influenced by previous NPPAs from the
firm and the firm’s competitors. To control for the impact of previous NPPAs, I included the
recalling firm’s and the competitor’s NPPAs in the past twelve months. Features of an NPPA
also influence market value of the firm pre-announcing new products (Sorescu et al., 2007; Talay
et al., 2017). These features include product innovativeness, pre-announcement specificity, preannouncement credibility, months to launch, and days between events.
Product innovativeness measures how new a product is to the market. This variable is a 5point scale, adopted from Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca (2017). “1” means the product model that
has been available in a foreign market will be introduced to the U.S. market. “2” means that the
product model simply replaces other models in the segment. “3” means that the product is a line
extension, that is, a model extends the product line in the same segment. “4” means that the
product model creates a new segment for the firm. “5” means that the product model is new to
the world.
Pre-announcement specificity measures the information richness of the new product model.
Typically, an NPPA includes at least of the following information about characteristics of a new
model: price, competition, segment, and the number of features (Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca
2017). The pre-announcement specificity is determined by the count of the characteristics above.
Pre-announcement creditability measures the probability of the new product introduction to
the market. Sorescu et al. (2007) operationalize this variable as a dummy variable, in which “1”
means if the pre-announcement is from the chief executive officer or a member of the top
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management team, otherwise is “0”. However, the news reported by a certified third party like
The New York Times indicates a higher likelihood of introducing a new product than the news
without the source. Thus, I measured this variable by using a 4-point scale. I coded the data as
“1” if there is no source attributed to the pre-announcement, “2” if there is a source attributed to
the pre-announcement, such as “the dealer said,” “3” if the source is from a certified third party
such as Dow Jones, Wall Street Journals, and The New York Times, and “4” if the source is from
top company managers such as the CEO or the CMO.
Months to launch measures the temporal distance between the pre-announcement date and
the planned launch date. Usually, a pre-announcement provides the information about the launch
time. Days between events measure the time between the pre-announcement date and the
preceding product recall. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among all
variables.
To ensure that the results are not influenced by outliers, I calculated the Cook’s distance
(Cook 1977). The maximum is 0.258, which is far below one, the cut-off point, indicating that
there is no outlier in the data.
Research Model
Equation (6) shows the model for Study 2.
(6) 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂0 + 𝜂𝜂1 𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂2 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂3 𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛉𝛉𝑇𝑇 Z𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Where 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is competitor j’s cumulative abnormal returns for NPPA q after firm i’s

recall k; 𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the recalling firm i’s corporate product reliability at the time of product

recall k; 𝐶𝐶_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is competitor j’s corporate product reliability at the time of NPPA q directly

after firm i’s product recall k; 𝐙𝐙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables at the time of NPPA q after
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firm i’s recall k; 𝜂𝜂0 , 𝜂𝜂1 𝜂𝜂2 , 𝜂𝜂3 , and 𝛉𝛉 are to be estimated, where θ𝑇𝑇 is a vector of parameters

(θ1 , … , θ𝑛𝑛 ), where n is the number of control variables; and ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term.
Results

Table 6 presents the results for equation (6). The results show that the recalling firm’s CPR
negatively affects its competitor’s CAR (β=-0.033, p<0.05), supporting H3. The coefficient of
the interaction between the two firm’s CPR is significantly positive (β=0.010, p<0.05). Figure2.
displays the interaction, supporting H4.

Additional Analysis
As in Study 1, I used the four-factor model to calculate CAR and found consistent results (the
competitor’s CPR: β=-0.040, p<.01; the interaction: β=0.010, p<.01). I also tested my hypotheses
by using year-fixed effects, obtaining similar results (the competitor’s CPR: β=-0.037, p<.01; the
interaction: β=0.011, p<.01). Moreover, competition strength does not affect the negative
spillover effect (β=0.0016, p=0.708). After considering the market similarity, I still obtained
consistent results (the competitor’s CPR: β=-0.033, p<.01; the interaction: β=0.010, p<.01).
Product newness does not significantly affect the negative spillover effect (β =-0.0038, p =
0.501). In addition, I also used the control function approach as in Study 1 to check the issue of

endogeneity resulted from omitted variables bias. The results still support my hypotheses (the
competitor’s CPR: β=-0.032, p<.01; the interaction: β=0.010, p<.01).
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Table 7. Correlations, means, and standard deviation (Study 2)
1
2
3
4
5
1.C_CAR2 1
2.R_CPR
-.226*
1
.030
-.137
1
3.C_CPR
-.150
-.191*
.129
1
4.R_AD
-.290**
.423**
-.098
.622** 1
5.R_RD
-.159
.011
.093
.747** .667**
6.R_BD
-.065
-.061
.029
.099
.210*
7.R_H
-.050
.060
-.116
-.127
-.127
8.C_AD
**
.048
-.070
.558
-.045
-.156
9.C_RD
.122
.039
.077
-.138
-.066
10.C_BD
.035
.044
-.078
-.130
-.011
11.C_H
.041
-.071
.019
-.211* -.161
12.R_Frq
.190*
-.390**
.111
-.192* -.418**
13.C_Frq
**
.068
-.282
.174
-.002
-.135
14.Hzd
-.041
-.051
.102
.028
.042
15.Vlm
.024
-.022
.173
.167
.109
16.R_Pub
.000
-.012
.067
.045
.066
17.C_Pub
-.068
.232*
.111
.144
.265**
18.SMC
-.004
-.139
.050
.043
-.048
19.Ctry
*
.123
-.094
.013
.238
.111
20.Inv
-.183
-.015
-.059
.173
.166
21.Spc
.076
.116
-.066
-.104
-.002
22.Crd
.181
-.021
-.156
-.181
-.173
23.Mth
.084
.152
.061
-.081
.045
24.Days
25.Yr
.055
-.140
.004
.170
.196*
.002
3.384
3.405 3.561 3.813
Mean
.028
.922
.987
.127
.143
S.D.
** P<.01; * P<.05
S.D.= Standard Deviation

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1
.334**
-.165
-.151
-.198*
.016
-.236*
-.247*
-.056
.004
.090
.085
.202*
-.076
.117
.132
-.083
-.225*
-.118
-.008
13.832
4.199

1
-.221*
-.254**
-.090
.336**
-.103
-.150
.004
-.227*
-.073
.124
-.134
-.224*
.027
-.127
-.060
.014
-.098
-.460**
8.318
4.509

1
.594**
.699**
.057
-.040
.139
.204*
.184
-.037
.093
.002
.040
-.042
-.046
-.001
-.029
.040
.138
3.569
.129

1
.668**
.150
-.028
.185
.257**
.158
.075
.131
.047
.101
-.031
-.073
-.031
-.102
.090
.247*
3.800
.190

1
.262**
-.033
.237*
.272**
.153
.031
.137
-.064
-.015
-.067
-.112
-.019
.015
.159
.135
14.103
4.346

1
-.033
.029
.087
-.124
-.209*
.046
-.198*
-.050
-.246*
-.205*
.053
.002
.122
-.397**
8.645
3.951

1
.412**
.255**
.198*
.030
-.094
-.066
.035
-.026
.048
.049
-.138
.114
-.032
1.019
1.780

1
.432**
.235*
-.073
-.036
-.101
.019
.025
.106
.004
-.099
.006
-.010
2.075
2.390

1
.297**
.097
.233*
.022
-.033
.007
-.035
.002
-.053
.001
.168
.271
.447
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Table 7. Correlations, means and standard deviation (Study 2, Continued)

Vlm
R_Pub
C_Pub
SMC
Ctry
Inv
Spc
Crd
Mth
Days
Yr
Mean
S.D.

15
1

16

17

18

19

20

.183

1

.094

.104

1

.128

-.019

.077

1

.044

.234*

.040

.004

1

-.074

.065

.015

.034

-.044

1

.094

-.024

.151

.118

-.101

.113

1

-.010

.202*

-.180

.128

.016

.287**

-.171

1

-.121

-.095

-.060

-.053

-.007

.225*

-.322**

.304**

1

-.059
.239*
5.104
.625

-.046
.134
1.570
3.163

-.009
.089
2.579
2.379

.071
.284**
3.168
4.022

-.046
.255**
.084
.279

.032
.261**
2.888
.769

.105
.241*
4.159
2.816

.198*
.081
1.720
1.139

-.035
.028
9.346
9.914

** P<.01; * P<.05
S.D.= Standard Deviation
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21

22

23

24

25

1
0.019
6.131
6.030

1
4.981
3.334

Table 8. The competitor’s abnormal returns around its NPPA after the product recall (Study 2)
The Competitor’s CAR
Coefficient
R.S.E.
t-value
-2.165
4.525
-.48

Intercept
Focal Independent Variables
The recalling firm’s CPR
The competitor’s CPR
The recalling firm’s CPR×
The competitor’s CPR
Control Variables
Recalling firm advertising
Recalling firm R&D
Recalling firm brand diversification
Recalling firm NPPA history
Competitor advertising
Competitor R&D
Competitor brand diversification
Competitor NPPA history
Recalling firm recall frequency
Competitor recall frequency
The recalled product harm severity
The current recall volume
Media coverage on the recalling firm's recall
Media coverage on the competitor's recall
Social media coverage
Country of origin
Days between recall and NPPA
Months to launch new products
Pre-announcement specificity
Pre-announcement credibility
Innovativeness
Year trend
Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
Firm 4
Firm 5
R-Square
Number of observations
*
p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01
R.S.E. refers to robust standard error.

-.033***
-.036***

.009
.006

-3.87
-6.29

.010***

.001

7.89

-.116
-.138**
-5.65E-04
-1.95E-04
-.039
.009
.001
1.811E-04
7.95E-04
.001
-.005
-1.35E-04
2.27E-04
-2.27E-04
6.73E-05
-.004
2.49E-04
1.15E-04
-.002
.001
.004
.002
.077
.032
.016
.094
.067

.093
.041
.003
.001
.053
.069
.001
.001
8.36E-04
.001
.01
.007
8.26E-04
.001
7.87E-05
.008
4.31E-04
3.16E-04
.001
.003
.003
.002
.053
.021
.031
.056
.048

-1.25
-3.35
-.20
-.27
-.75
.13
2.02
.15
.95
1.02
-.51
-.02
.27
-.16
.86
-.44
.58
.36
-1.80
.29
1.18
.73
1.47
1.51
.52
1.68
1.38

.368
107
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The Competitor's CAR

-2.25

Low competitor's CPR

High competitor's CPR

-2.3
Low
recalling firm's CPR

High
recalling firm's CPR

Figure 2. The moderating effect of the competitor's CPR in Study 2

General discussion
Theoretical implications
First, this essay extends the product recall literature by investigating the impact of CPR (the
recalling firm’s and the competitor’s) on competitors’ market value. The results of Study 1 show
that product recalls by a high-CPR firm can hurt competitors’ market value. That is, compared to
product recalls from low-CPR firms, product recalls from high-CPR firms have more negative
impact on the stock market industrywide. Extant literature mainly focuses on how product recalls
affect market value of the recalling firm rather than competitors (i.e., Gao et al., 2015; Liu et al.,
2017). Although only two studies have examined the spillover effect of product recalls on
competitors’ market value (Barber and Darrough 1996; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985), their findings
are inconsistent, which indicates that the spillover effect is more complex than expected. My
findings help researchers gain a better understanding of the spillover effect.
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Second, the results in Study 1 show that high CPR actually helps competitors buffer the
negative influence from product recalls by a high-CPR firm. The reason for this result is that
although both the recalling firm and the competitor produce high-quality products, investors lose
more confidence in products from the competitor with low CPR rather than that with high CPR.
This finding is contrary to the predication from prior studies, which show that product recalls
negatively affect a competitor that shares features, such as brand attributes (Roehm and Tybout
2006; Trump and Newman 2017) and country of origin (Borah and Tellis 2016), with the
recalling firm. Based on this perspective, one could conclude that if a recalling firm has high
CPR, its product recall should have more negative impact on a competitor with high-CPR rather
than that with low-CPR due to the similar level of product reliability. One explanation for the
contradiction is that CPR is different from the features in prior studies since CPR is an attribute
relevant to the safety of products. Although two firms with high CPR are similar, a competitor
with high CPR is less likely to be blamed for recalling its products than a competitor with low
CPR. Therefore, competitor’s high CPR could buffer the negative spillover effect due to the
recalling firm’s high CPR.
In addition, results of Study 2 indicate that a product recall from a high-CPR firm can affect
an investor’s reaction to its competitor’s NPPA directly following the product recall. The
consistent findings in Study 1 and Study 2 demonstrate that investors reduce their confidence in
the competitor’s product quality when a high-CPR firm recalls its products, and the reduction in
confidence extends to the competitor’s new products in NPPA after the recall. Recently, scholars
have begun to pay attention to the effect of a firm’s event on its competitor’s future event. For
example, Warren and Sorescu (2017) suggest that a firm’s NPPA can help investors shape the
expectation of future competitor’s NPPAs, thus reducing market value from future competitor’s
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NPPAs. While they study the same event from two different companies, I firstly examine two
different events from two different companies, that is, the spillover effect of a firm’s product
recall on its competitor’s NPPA. Even though product recall and NPPA are two different events,
they are product-related events. Although prior studies treat product recalls and NPPAs as
independent firm events, my results suggest that product recalls and NPPAs are not independent
from each other, and a firm’s product recall could affect investors’ reactions to its competitor’s
NPPA.
Regarding control variables, I find the harm severity of recalled products hurts a competitor’
market value in Study 1 (β=-0.009, p<0.05), but does not significantly affect investors’ reactions
to the competitor’s NPPA in Study 2 (β=-0.005, p=0.663). This finding is very interesting. In my
dataset, the average temporal distance between product recalls and NPPAs is six days. Hence,
one reason for the inconsistent findings could be that investors could not remember specific
features of the product recall when an NPPA is announced, but could remember the name of the
recalling firm prior to the NPPA.

Managerial implications
Managers might think their competitors’ recalls are irrelevant to their own businesses, or
even they can benefit from their competitors’ misfortune. However, I find that product recalls
have more negative impact on the competitor’s market value as the recalling firm’s product
quality increases. The reason is that product recalls from firms with high product quality shake
investors’ confidence in product quality of competitors. For example, on January 18, 2013,
Honda recalled about 750,000 Odyssey passenger vehicles due to the missing rivets, which could
alter the performance of the driver’s airbag during deployment. The average abnormal return for
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other automakers (i.e., Chrysler, Ford, GM, Nissan, Toyota) is -2.7%. Moreover, I find that
investors lose more confidence in product quality of competitors with low product quality than
that of competitors with high product quality. Another example is that Nissan recalled around 1
million of its vehicles due to the airbag failure on March 25, 2014. Around this date, Chrysler’s
abnormal return is -1.3%, while Honda’s is -0.05% and Toyota’s is 5.4%. Therefore, to reduce
the negative spillover impact, competitors, especially those with low product quality, should
promote their product quality, like the quality certification from a third party, and consolidate
investors’ revision of its quality reputation. For instance, when Toyota announces a product
recall, Kia can emphasize that its Sorento and Rio received 2018 Quality Award from J.D.
Power, keeping in mind the possible negative spillover effects.
Second, managers should be cautious about pre-announcing their new products. Preannouncing new products is a common competitive strategy for a company to strengthen
investors’ confidence in the company (Sorescu et al., 2007). Managers might think preannouncing their new products after their competitors’ recalls can increase their market value
because new products can increase future cash flows by attracting consumers from the recalling
firm. However, my results show that a recall can hurt a competitor’s market value when it is
announced by a firm with high product quality, and the negative spillover effect can extend to
the moment when the competitor announces an NPPA directly after the product recall. The
negative spillover effect is stronger for a competitor with lower product quality. In the
automobile industry, automakers usually pre-announce their new versions of car models to boost
their market. However, I suggest that managers, especially from companies with low product
quality, should not pre-announce their new products after a product recall by their competitor
with high product quality. For example, Ford pre-announced its 2015 Expedition on February 20,
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2014, eight days after Toyota’s recall about 700,000 Prius due to the inverter failure. The
abnormal return for Ford is about -1%. Since the market capitalization of Ford at that time was
around $60 Billion, Ford lost about $0.6 billion of its market capitalization. Besides, if a firm has
to pre-announce new products after its competitor’s product recall, it is better for a firm with
high product quality to do that.

Limitations and future research directions
Although results of this essay provide insights into the spillover effect of product recalls,
there are some limitations to the research. First, this research examines the effect of CPR on the
spillover effect of product recalls on competitors’ market value by using data from the U.S.
automobile industry. These research findings could be replicated in other industries provided
fine-grained recall data as in the automobile industry is available.
In my research, I only focused on the effect of firm-level corporate product reliability.
However, future research could investigate other factors affecting the spillover effect. For
example, researchers could examine how the “newness” of a recalled product moderates the
negative spillover effect on competitors. Unfortunately, the automobile industry is not an
appropriate context to examine the “newness” of a recalled product. Since automakers recall both
their new (e.g., Camry 2019) and existing products (e.g., Camry 2015) at the same time, it is
difficult to identify a recall in the automobile industry that only involves new products. That’s
why Gao et al., (2015) use a variable called newness to measure whether a new product in
involved in a recall. Future studies can examine product recalls in other industries that only
involve one product, like Samsung Galaxy Note 7, which can measure the newness of a recalled
product.
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Advertising is a common strategy for the recalling firm to cope with its recalls (Gao et al.,
2015; Liu et al., 2017). Brand advertising focuses on building the long-term brand equity, while
promotional advertising emphasizes increasing the short-term sales. Liu et al. (2017) have shown
the two types of advertising strategies differentially influence the recalling firm’s market value.
Future studies could seek to understand how the recalling firm’s brand and promotional
advertising affect a competitor’s market value.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF PRODUCT RECALL PATTERN ON THE RECALLING FIRM’S
REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
Introduction
Last decade has witnessed a growing number of product recalls due to the increasing
complexity of products and more stringent product-safety laws. For example, automakers
recalled about 2.1 million more vehicles in 2016 than in 2015, setting a record of 927 recall
campaigns worldwide (Shepardson 2017). Prior studies have found product recalls to negatively
affect the recalling firm as consumers reduce their intentions to purchase the recalled brand
(Klein and Dawar 2004) and view the recalling firm negatively (Lei, Dawar, and Lemmink
2008). Most studies on product recalls have focused on the effect of a single recall event on
consumers’ purchase intentions (e.g., Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto
2013), brand perception (e.g., Germann et al. 2014; Klein and Dawar 2004; Lei, Dawar, and
Gürhan-Canli 2012), and quality perception (e.g., Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg 2002).
Now companies recall their products frequently, however, less attention has been paid to the
cumulative effect of frequent product recalls on consumers’ reactions or attitudes.
Recently, scholars have become interested in “repeated” firm events. For example, Warren
and Sorescu (2017) examine investors’ reactions to frequent new product announcements, and
find that previous new product announcements reduce investors’ positive reactions to the latest
new product announcement. Similarly, Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar (2018) investigate how
frequent new product introductions affect firm value. They find that a firm’s market value in the
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stock market can be hurt when the number of its introduced new products exceed a certain point.
Recently, Dotzel and Shankar (2019) have examined the effect of frequent service innovations
on firm value. They find that the number of service innovations can improve a firm’s market
value in the stock market.
While these studies have paid attention to frequent announcements about innovation, the
effect of frequent product recalls on firm reputation has not been studied. Product recalls are
distinct from innovation announcements since they are not desired events from companies.
Product recalls frequently occur to a company recently. For example, in 2018, Ford recalled
about 1.4 million, 0.35 million, and 2 million vehicles in March, April, and September,
respectively. In the same year, Toyota recalled its vehicles six times (February 14, February 20,
April 3, September 5, October 4, and December 13). Little is known about how frequent product
recalls affect the recalling firm’s reputation. Firm reputation is defined as an overall judgment of
a firm based on its past actions (Fombrun 1996). It is important to investigate the effect because
of mixed conclusions in the existing literature. Due to consumers’ negative reactions to a single
product recall (Klein and Dawar 2004), frequent recalls could intensify consumers’ negative
reactions. However, due to habituation theory (Groves and Thompson 1970), repeated product
recalls could cause consumers to get used to product recalls and thus lessen consumers’ negative
reactions to frequent product recalls. Therefore, it is unclear about the effect of frequent product
recalls on the recalling firm’s reputation.
In addition, while researchers mainly use lab experiments to investigate the short-term
customers’ reactions, such as brand purchase (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, and
Rocereto 2013) and brand perception (Klein and Dawar 2004; Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli
2012), little is known about how consumers react to the recalling firm in the long run, like one
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year or two years later. Although a product recall hurts a firm’s reputation shortly, the negative
effect can be strengthened or weakened in the long term as explained in the above paragraph.
Moreover, since a single product recall hurts the recalling firm’s reputation, and managers must
want to know how long the negative impact is going to persist. Moreover, when product recalls
happen frequently, they could cause far-reaching influence. Therefore, it is very important to
investigate the long-term effect of product recalls on firm reputation. To the best of my
knowledge, only Liu et al. (2017) have examined the long-term effect of product recall volume
on investors’ reactions. They find that the number of recalled products hurts the recalling firm’s
financial value in one year. Financial value reflects investors’ expectations of the recalling firm’s
future cash flow, which is directly determined by consumers’ reactions. Regarding the long-term
effect of frequent product recalls on consumers’ reactions, some empirical studies suggest that
frequent product recalls might enhance the recalling firm’s reputation because more product
recalls can motivate firms to learn from their mistakes, thus increasing product quality
(Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). However, to the best of
my knowledge, none of prior studies has directly investigated the long-term effect of product
recalls on the recalling firm’s reputation.
To address the research gap above, I identify product recall pattern, which forms when a firm
recalls its products multiple times. Frequent product recalls involve the number of recalls and
recall timing, which forms product recall pattern. In this essay, I identified five features of
product recall pattern: recall frequency (number of product recalls), recall volume (number of
recalled items), recall pace (average speed of recall timing), recall clumpiness (lack of the
consistency in recall timing), and recall recency (the timing of the latest recall). I demonstrate the
rationale for the five features in the following section.
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Then, to examine the long-term effect, I obtain a unique dataset about annual firm’s
reputation from the Corebrand Index, which has tracked firm reputation of more than 8,000
public companies in the last twenty years. This dataset has been used in the practitioner journals
(Gregory & Moore, 2013; Gregory, Satterfield, & Puckey, 2018; Gregory & Sexton, 2007).
Thus, the objective of this study is to examine the long-term effect of product recall pattern on
the recalling firm’s reputation.
To fulfill this objective, I make two core contributions to the literature. First, this essay
enriches the literature of product recalls by studying frequent product recalls. This essay
responds to the research call from a recent review article on product recalls that “do more
frequent product recalls in the industry attenuate or amplify the reaction of consumers?”(Cleeren,
Dekimpe, & van Heerde, 2017, p.595). I employ attribution theory (Weiner 1985) to establish
the arguments for my hypotheses. Second, I extend the effect of product recalls on firm
reputation from a short term to a long term. In this essay, a long term is defined as a period of at
least one year. Prior studies mainly use lab experiments to examine the effect of product recalls
on the recalling firm’s reputation (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012;
Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013). However, lab experiments can only capture consumers’
reactions to a recalling firm shortly after a single product recall. And, it is very hard to
understand the evolving change of consumers’ reactions a few years after repeated product
recalls, that is, the long-term effect. I use a unique dataset including annual firm reputation and
apply the vector auto-regression model to examine the long-term effect.
The reminder of this essay is organized as follows. I first introduce the features of product
recall pattern and review the literature on the relationship between product recalls and firm
reputation. Second, I provide theoretical foundation and develop my hypotheses. Then, I present
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model specifications in my study and show empirical analysis, as well as interpret the results
based on the empirical analysis. I conclude with a discussion about theoretical and managerial
implications, as well as about limitations and future research.

Conceptual Background and Literature Review
Product Recall Pattern
This essay focuses on a repeated event, that is, product recall. Prior studies have regarded
firm event as a process rather than a static state (Pettigrew 1992; Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar
2018). For example, Sharma et al. (2018) view new product introduction as a process of the
evolution of new products over time. Prior studies have shown evidence that firms can learn
from their product recalls, thus making their products more reliable (Haunschild and Rhee 2004;
Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). The literature of process research also emphasizes
the importance of how an event is announced, and argues that temporal sequence is an important
factor influencing the impact of firm event (Pettigrew 1992; Van de Ven 1992). In the context of
product recalls, managers need to make a decision about when to announce a product recall
(Eilert et al. 2017), that is, recall timing. Recall timing determines the temporal interval between
two product recalls. Therefore, the impact of frequent product recalls depends on not only the
number of product recalls but also recall timing.
Although the literature of marketing strategy just started to focus on repeated events, like
innovation (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar 2018), direct marketing
literature has studied consumers’ repeated purchases and estimates customer lifetime value by
using the method of RFM (Recency, Frequency, and Monetary Value). Consumers’ repeated
purchases are akin to companies’ repeated product recalls, since the former is that consumers
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repeatedly buy products from one store, and the latter is that companies repeatedly recall their
products from the market. Even though product recalls are an event from companies, they can
influence consumers’ attitudes towards the recalling firms, thus affecting the reputation of the
recalling firm. I propose that product recall pattern occurs when a firm recalls its products
frequently. Hence, adapting the method of RFM, I identify three characteristics of repeated
recalls: recall frequency, recall volume, and recall recency. Recall frequency is how many
product recalls are announced by a firm. Recall volume is how many affected products are
recalled by a firm. Usually, the higher recall volume, the more negative impact of a product
recall on the market (Liu, Shankar, and Yun 2017). Recall volume responds to monetary value in
RFM. Recall recency is how recently a firm recalls its products. Since a consumer’s attitude to a
firm changes over time, a recent recall might influence a consumer’s evaluation on a firm.
Scholars have realize the impact of recall frequency, but they do not investigate frequent product
recalls systematically. Kalaignanam et al. (2013) find that a firm’s recall frequency can reduce its
recall frequency in the future (one year later). Other studies use prior recall frequency as a
control variable to study investors’ reactions to current product recall (Eilert et al. 2017; Gao et
al. 2015; Liu, Shankar, and Yun 2017), but they find that prior recall frequency does not affect
investors’ reactions, indicating the necessary effort to identify other characteristics of frequent
product recalls.
In the direct marketing literature, recency can only capture the latest time of customer
purchase without indicating the timing of customer purchase prior to the latest purchase (Zhang,
Bradlow, and Small 2015). Similarly, in the context of product recalls, recall recency is not able
to capture the distribution of frequent product recalls (i.e., recall timing in prior product recalls).
In this essay, I add two more characteristics to capture the distribution of a firm’s past recalls:
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recall pace and recall clumpiness. Recall pace is how fast a firm recalls its products. A firm’s
product recalls can be spread out over a long period or be packed during a short period. Recall
pace can measure how close all product recalls are. However, the closeness can vary between
two nearby product recalls. I use recall clumpiness to capture the distribution of the closeness
between two nearby product recalls. Recall clumpiness is how inconsistently a firm recalls its
products. Zhang, Bradlow, and Small (2015) introduce clumpiness to the literature and defined it
as “the degree of nonconformity to equal spacing” (p. 196). They find that clumpiness is one
effective factor determining customer lifetime value. In this essay, recall frequency, recall
volume, recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness are the characteristics of product recall
pattern, among which recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness are related to recall
timing.
Recall frequency, recall volume, and recall recency are straightforward. This paragraph is
going to illustrate recall pace and recall clumpiness. Let us assume that Firm A, B, C, and D are
four firms in the same industry (see Figure 3). Each firm announces six product recalls during a
calendar year. Firm A announces product recalls every two months, spanning ten months. Firm
B’s six recalls also cover ten months, but they are more irregularly announced than Firm A’s
recalls. Firm C announces product recalls every month, spanning five months. Same to Firm C’s
product recalls, Firm D’s product recalls cover five months, but Firm D does not recall its
products as regularly as Firm C. Recall pace measures the speed of announcing product recalls,
and recall clumpiness reflects the degree of inconsistency in recall spacing over a calendar year.
Since Firm A and Firm B have the same number of product recalls covering the same period,
Firm A and Firm B have the same recall pace. Similarly, Firm C and Firm D have the same
recall pace.
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Because product recalls from Firm A/B cover longer period than those from Firm C/D, Firm
C and Firm D have higher recall pace than Firm A and Firm B. Regarding recall clumpiness,
since Firm A and Firm C recalled their products more regularly than Firm B and Firm D, recall
clumpiness is higher for product recalls from Firm B and Firm D than Firm A and Firm C. Recall
clumpiness accounts for the temporal interval between the beginning (end) of the calendar year
and the first (last) event. Since Firm D’s first and last recalls have further distance from the ends
of the calendar year than Firm B’s, Firm D has higher recall clumpiness than Firm B.

A: low recall pace; Low recall clumpiness

B: low recall pace; Moderate recall clumpiness

C: High recall pace; Low recall clumpiness

D: High recall pace; High recall clumpiness

Figure 3. Illustration of recall pace and recall clumpiness

In the literature of marketing strategy, scholars have focused on one repeated event—new
product or innovation. They examine the impact of frequent innovation events on investors’
reactions. Warren and Sorescu (2017) argue that previous new product announcements could
help investors formulate the expectation about the future product announcement, thus reducing
investors’ positive reactions to the future product announcement. Dotzel and Shankar (2019) are
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interested in new service innovation announcements and find that the number of both businessto-business and business-to-consumer service innovation announcements can increase firm value
in terms of Tobin’s q, but only the number of business-to-business service innovation
announcements increase firm value in terms of abnormal stock returns. Dotzel and Shankar
(2019) and Warren and Sorescu (2017) mainly focus on the frequency of innovation events.
Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar (2018) study the event of new product introductions in the
pharmaceutical industry. In their research, the irregularity of new product introduction is an
important characteristic about the timing of new product introductions. The irregularity indicates
a lack of rhythm in the process of new product introductions (Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar 2018).
They find that the irregularity of new product introduction negatively affects firm value. Similar
to irregularity, clumpiness also measures the lack of rhythm in the event recalling. The difference
between irregularity and clumpiness is that irregularity only considers time intervals between
two events, but clumpiness accounts for not only time intervals between two events, but also
time intervals between the end of the observation period and an event. Clumpiness can better
show the distribution of frequent events in a certain period. Prior studies mainly focus on
repeated events related to innovation and investors’ reactions to the repeated events. Although
innovation announcements and product recalls both are repeated events for firms, product recalls
are negative events for firms. Moreover, recalled products directly affect consumers’ interests,
thus influencing consumers’ attitudes towards the recalling firm. Unfortunately, the literature has
not investigated consumers’ reactions to frequent product recalls. This study is going to fill the
research gap.
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Product Recalls and Firm Reputation
Firms announce product recalls when their products have defects that threaten the safety of
consumers. The defects, which include problems with parts and flaws in design, could cause
product failures. Using lab experiments, prior studies have demonstrated product recalls could
hurt the recalling firm’s reputation because consumers are not willing to purchase products from
the recalled brand or generate negative word of mouth (e.g., Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein &
Dawar, 2004; Puzakova et al., 2013).
Some studies contend that whether the recalled brand is blamed for a product recallrecall
plays a critical role in consumers’ reactions to the recalling firm. Klein and Dawar (2004) show
that blame mediates the negative effect of product recalls on brand evaluation, thus influencing
consumers’ purchasing intentions. Lei et al. (2012) examine factors determining the blame,
finding that for brands with positive prior belief, they are less blamed when similar recalls exist
in the industry or when the frequency of recalls is low in the industry. Cleeren, van Heerde, and
Dekimpe (2013) reveal that blame can reduce the effectiveness of advertising on the recalling
firm’s sales. Therefore, when a product recall occurs, consumers tend to find out who is
responsible for the product recall.
In addition, prior studies argue that firm reputation also influences consumers’ reactions to
product recalls. However, the existing literature presents conflicting arguments about the
influence. On one hand, some assert that high brand equity alleviates the consumer’s negative
response to product recalls because benefits of high reputation offset the negative effect of
product recalls (Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012), and consumers are less likely to blame
product recalls on a favorable and familiar brand (Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001).
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For example, Hsu and Lawrence (2016) find that negative online word of mouth has less impact
on the value of the firm with strong reputation than that with weak reputation.
On the other hand, others contend that high prior brand equity worsens the consumer’s
negative response due to a feeling of betrayal. Based on the expectancy-disconfirmation theory
(Oliver 1977), consumers have a higher expectation for a brand with high reputation than that
with low reputation. Product recalls cause stronger disconfirmation for the recalling firm with
high reputation than that with low reputation. For example, Liu and Shankar (2015) show that
product recalls cause more loss of sales for the brand with high reputation. Because of the
controversy over the effect, Germann et al. (2014) argue that the effect of brand commitment on
the consumer’s response to product recalls depends on the recall severity. They find that when
product recalls involve high severity, brand commitment negatively affects brand attitudes; the
effect is reversed when product recalls involve low severity. Thus, these studies suggest that a
firm’s reputation prior to its recall affects the firm’s reputation after its recall.
With respect to methodology, the existing literature primarily investigates the relationship
between firm reputation and product recalls through lab experiments (Dawar and Pillutla 2000;
Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013). Although the
existing literature has provided some insights, it presents several issues. The first is that
researchers mainly focus on the short-term customers’ reactions, such as brand purchase (Dawar
and Pillutla 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013) and brand perception (Klein and Dawar
2004; Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012). However, firm reputation is not established
overnight. Liu et al. (2017) have found that the recalled volume hurts the recalling firm’s
financial value one year later. Also, previous studies mainly focus on consumer’s responses to a
single product recall event. In addition, due to the complexity of products and supply chains,

56

now product recalls are more and more common in industries so that consumers might get used
to product recalls so that they might not be affected by product recalls. In other words, as firms
repeatedly recall their products, the effect of a single product recall on consumers’ response
might be limited. The literature has not investigated how consumers respond to frequent product
recalls.
As mentioned above, a product recall can affect the recalling firm’s reputation. Meanwhile,
firm reputation also influences a recalling firm’s decision on time to recall. For example, Eilert et
al. (2017) find that a firm with higher reputation in product reliability is more likely to hasten the
time to recall. Therefore, product recall pattern and firm reputation can influence each other at
the same time. To account for the issue of reverse causality and capture the long-term effect of
product recalls on firm reputation, I apply a vector auto-regression (VAR) model to analyze the
data compiled to examine the issue (more details provided in the section of Methodology and
Empirical Analysis.)

Theoretical Foundation and Hypotheses Development
Product recall is a product-harm crisis that involves defective or dangerous products. When a
product recall occurs, consumers spontaneously seek attributions of blame for the recall or
harmful products (Klein and Dawar 2004). Weiner's (1985) attribution model identifies three
causal dimensions of attributions that result in an overall judgement of blame: locus of causality,
stability, and controllability. Locus of causality refers to whether or not the cause of an event is
internal or external to a firm. Consumers tend to blame the firm for the event if the cause is
internal (e.g., poor internal quality management). Stability refers to whether the event is
perceived to be stable or temporary. Consumers tend to attribute an event to a firm if the event
seems stable or to other factors if the event is perceived to be a one-off event (Whelan and
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Dawar 2016). Controllability refers to whether the event is within or outside the control of the
firm. If consumers perceive that the firm could have prevented an event, they tend to blame the
firm for the event (Whelan and Dawar 2016).
In the product recall literature, blame has played a critical role in influencing consumers’
belief about a firm (Klein and Dawar 2004; Whelan and Dawar 2016). When consumers attribute
product recalls to the recalling firm, they will negatively evaluate the recalling firm, thus
harming the recalling firm’s reputation. Because this study focuses on frequent product recalls
and investigates the effect of frequent product recalls on the recalling firm’s reputation, I are
going to use the dimension of stability as theoretical foundation to investigate how frequent
product recalls affect the recalling firm’s reputation. I propose that if consumers perceive a
firm’s product recalls are stable, they tend to blame the recalling firm for its frequent product
recalls, thus hurting the recalling firm’s reputation. When a firm frequently recalls its products or
recalls a number of its products, consumers would perceive the firm’s product recalls are stable.
Hence, consumers are likely to blame product recalls on the recalling firm. Even though recall
frequency and recall volume are two characteristics of product recall pattern, I am not going to
hypothesize the effects of these two characteristics on firm reputation since their effects are
pretty straightforward. According to attribution theory. Briefly, high frequent product recalls
mean that a firm recalls its products repeatedly, indicating a high stability of product recalls
within the firm. Moreover, high frequent product recall results in high recall volume. Therefore,
according to attribution theory, recall frequency and recall volume hurt the recalling firm’s
reputation. In this essay, I am going to pay more attention to other characteristics (i.e., recall
recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness) related to product recall timing.
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Recall Recency
Consumers’ preferences over a firm are changing over time because they are exposed to
various news each day. Product recalls usually signal negative messages to the market place. The
impact of product recalls on consumers’ reactions to the recalling firm might depend on recall
recency. Recall recency is about the temporal interval between the timing of the latest recall and
the observation point of consumers’ reactions. Since in this study firm reputation is an annual
measurement, recall recency is only measured once a year. The observation point is the end of a
year or the beginning of the following year. High recall recency means the latest recall is
announced far from the observation point; low recall recency indicates a short temporal distance
between the latest recall and the observation point. The closer a recall is announced to the
observed point, more information or media coverage is disseminated and reaches out to
consumers. Since consumers are impressed with a firm’s latest product recall, they might be
reminded of the firm’s previous recalls and associate this product recalls with the firm’s previous
recalls. Hence, consumers perceive that product recalls are stable in the firm. However, if a
product recall is far from the observation point, consumers might have little impression with the
latest recall and are distracted by other news or events. When consumers are interviewed at the
point far from the latest recall, they are less likely to remember the latest recall and product
recalls prior to the latest recall. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H1. High recall recency has less negative impact on the recalling firm’s reputation than low
recall recency.
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Recall Pace
Recall pace measures the average speed of announcing product recalls. High recall pace
indicates on average all product recalls are close to each other. Recall pace can affect consumers’
judgement over the recalling firm in two ways. First, when product recalls are announced closer
to each other, consumers might believe that these recalls are related to each other and caused by
the same reason, thus reducing the perceived number of distinct product recalls. Attribution
theory suggests that the reduced number indicates less stability of product recalls, thus
attenuating consumers’ negative reactions to product recalls. Second, high recall pace can signal
that once the firm identifies a defect in its products, it takes actions quickly to protect its
consumers and commit to customer safety, which also weakens consumers’ negative reactions to
product recalls. In contrast, low recall pace indicates that companies recall their products slowly,
which means that consumers are reminded of the company’s recalls for a longer period. In
addition, consumers might have such impression that the recalling firm makes mistakes again
and cannot effectively learn from its prior mistakes or does not put customer’s safety as a priority
(Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). Therefore, I hypothesize:
H2. High recall pace has less negative impact on the recalling firm’s reputation than low recall
pace.

Recall clumpiness
Recall pace can reflect the closeness among product recalls. However, it cannot indicate how
product recalls are temporally distributed. For example, two firms can recall their products four
times within four months. One firm announces its product recalls once a month in a period of
four months, while the other announces three in the first month and the last one three month
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later. Although recall pace is the same to the two firms (one per month), the four product recalls
are differently distributed. In this essay, I argue that the evenness with which the recalls are
spaced from each other could also influence consumers’ perceptions of the stability of product
recalls. Recall clumpiness can not only measure the unevenness but also capture the clustered
events over the time line. For example, in Figure 1, Firm A has low recall clumpiness since its
recalls are equally spaced. But Firm D has high recall clumpiness because its recalls are clustered
and the two clusters are far from each other. High recall clumpiness means that a firm announces
some of its product recalls in a short time. In other words, the firm’s product recalls are clustered
into different groups. As mentioned in the rationale for H2, consumers’ perceived number of
product recalls is lower when product recalls are announced in a short period. Clustered product
recalls indicate that some product recalls occur more closely than others do. So consumers
perceive less number of product recalls when product recalls are more clustered. Moreover,
when product recalls are evenly distributed, according to attribution theory, consumers would
conclude that product recalls are very stable for the recalling firm. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H3. High recall clumpiness has a less negative impact on the recalling firm’s reputation than low
recall clumpiness.

Method
Data and Sources
To test the hypotheses, I chose to collect data from the U.S. automobile industry for several
reasons. First, product recalls repeatedly occur in the U.S. automobile industry, and each product
recall is recorded in the website of NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration).As such, data about recall frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall
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clumpiness, and recall recency are available. Second, since the automobile industry accounts for
3% of U.S. GDP, results from the automobile industry can provide significant practical
implications (Borah and Tellis 2016).
I collected data from two sources: NHTSA and Corebrand Index. NHTSA provides data
about characteristics of product recall pattern (i.e., recall frequency, recall volume, recall pace,
recall clumpiness, and recall recency). NHTSA lists the announcement date for each product
recall, the number of items recalled, and the reason for each product recall. I use this information
to measure the characteristics of product recall pattern during a calendar year (i.e., 365 days).
This essay investigates the long-term effect of repeated product recalls. To ensure the long-term
effect, I selected product recalls involving a certain number of affected items as I did in Essay 1.
Sometimes a company only recalls a small number of items. For example, on August 9 2011,
Nissan recalled about 54 vehicles due to the failure of air bags. Due to the small number, this
recall cannot catch attention from media and consumers, thus, exerting a limited impact on
Nissan’s reputation. Thus, all recalls in my data involve at least 20,000 vehicles. The final data
consists of 458 product recalls of nine automakers from 2005 to 2015. The nine car
manufacturers are Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, Mitsubishi,
Volkswagen, and Volvo. These manufacturers produce more than 90% of vehicles in the US
market (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013). Thus, results from these companies are
representative to the U.S. auto industry. In addition, companies recall their products voluntarily
or involuntarily. Involuntary recalls mean that a company recalls its products due to an
investigation from the government or regulatory agency, while voluntary recalls mean that a
company recalls its products after noticing a defect. Of 458 product recalls, 96 recalls are
involuntary, accounting for about 21% of the total product recalls. In other words, most of
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product recalls are voluntary recalls, indicating that companies are flexible to choose the timing
of product recall. Even though a company’s product is under investigation, it can still make a
decision on the recall timing (Eilert et al. 2017). Therefore, the results from this data can provide
some managerial implications on the decision of product recall timing.
Firm reputation. Corebrand Index provides data about firm reputation. Corebrand Index is a
proprietary dataset from Tenet Partners (www. Tenetpartners.com) that has collected data on
firm reputation over the last 20 years. This dataset is used by firms such as GE and AT&T to
monitor their corporate reputation on an ongoing basis. The respondents are influential
consumers and business executives who work in the top 20% based on the revenue of U.S.
business. Each year Tenet Partners interview about 800 managers, who are asked about their
opinions on a firm’s reputation. Firm reputation is measured by a single item with a 4-point
scale. The single item is “Please indicate your impressions of the overall reputation of (insert
company name). 4 = “excellent,” 3 = “good,” 2 = “fair,” and 1 = “poor.” The final score is a
weighted firm reputation score (0-100), which is calculated based on the strength of the
responses. 1 The average, maximum, and minimum scores of firm reputation are 78.11, 91.18,
and 64.53, respectively.
Recall frequency. Recall frequency is the number of significant product recalls during a
calendar year. In this study, a significant product recall is the one in which the number of
recalled vehicles is large in proportion to firm size (Gao et al. 2015; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985).
If a product recall only involves several hundred or even less than one hundred vehicles, the
influence of the product recall is limited in the long term. Therefore, I identified the significant
product recalls by checking the number of affected vehicles. Based on the criteria in Gao et al.

1

I am not allowed to provide more detailed information about the measurement of firm reputation due to the
business secret.
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(2015), the number varies among firms, that is, 50,000 recalled vehicles for Toyota; 40,000
recalled vehicles for General Motors and Ford; 30,000 recalled vehicles for Honda; or 20,000
recalled vehicles for Nissan, Mazda, Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, and Volvo.
Recall volume. Recall volume is measured by the logarithm of the total number of affected
vehicles due to a major problem during a calendar year. Companies recall their vehicles for
various reasons. Some reasons are from major problems that may cause fire or car crash, but
some are from minor problems that do not significantly affect the safety of consumers. Major
problems include fuel leakage, acceleration problems, brake failure, airbag failure, and visibility
(Gao et al. 2015).
Recall pace. Recall pace reflects how fast a company announces its product recalls during a
calendar year. I calculated recall pace by using the temporal interval between the first and last
product recalls during a calendar year divided by the total number of product recalls at the
calendar year (see Equation (7)). This number can reflect the closeness of a firm’s product
recalls. In Equation (7), the negative sign is to indicate that the higher value of recall pace, the
faster recall pace, which is helpful for interpreting results.

(7)

𝑙𝑙

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡

𝑡𝑡

Where
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = The temporal interval between the first and last product recalls at year t
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = The number of product recalls at year t

Recall clumpiness. Recall clumpiness measures the consistency of product recall timing. The
higher recall clumpiness, the less consistency of product recall timing, which means a company
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does not recall its products regularly. The measure of recall clumpiness is presented in Equation
(8). The formula indicates that recall clumpiness not only considers the temporal interval
between product recalls but also accounts for the period between the first (last) product recall
and the beginning (end) of the year.

(8)

∑𝑛𝑛+1
𝑖𝑖=1 log(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖t ) ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖t
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 1 +
log (𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 +1)

𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = The number of product recalls during a year

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖t = The ratio of temporal interval (days) between two observed points at year t to the length

of one calendar year (365 days). i = 1, 2,…, n, n+1. 𝑥𝑥1 is the ratio of the temporal interval

between the beginning of the year t (Jan. 1st) and the first product recall to the length of one
calendar year. 𝑥𝑥(n+1)t is the ratio of the temporal interval between the last product recall and
the end of the year t (Dec. 31st) to the length of one calendar year. Other 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (i = 2,…,n)

represent the ratio of the temporal interval between two close product recalls at year t to the
length of one calendar year.
Recall recency. Recall recency is to measure the influence of the timing of the latest product
recall on consumers’ reactions. Since the unit of observation period in this essay is one calendar
year (i.e., January 1st to December 31st), recall recency is measured by the temporal interval
between the last product recall and the end of the year, that is, 𝑥𝑥(n+1)t in the formula of recall

clumpiness. In our data, firm reputation at year t is collected at the beginning of year t+1. For
example, data on firm reputation at 2012 was collected at the beginning of 2013. The last recall
in 2012 could affect consumers’ reactions to the recalling firm when consumers were asked at
the beginning of 2013. Therefore, recall recency is measured as an annual variable.
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Control variables. Control variables include the number of competitors’ recalls, the recalling
firm’s product quality, press coverage about the focal firm’s recalls, and recall scope.
Competitors’ recalls can affect consumers’ reactions to the recalling firm since consumers are
less likely to attribute product recalls to a recalling firm if other firms in the industry also have
product recalls (Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012). We measure competitors’ recalls as the
number of product recalls from competitors of a focal firm in the observed year. A firm’s
product quality can affect consumers’ reactions to the recalling firm. On one hand, high product
quality can offset the negative influence caused by product recalls (Lei, Dawar, and GürhanCanli 2012). On the other hand, consumers usually have expectations of a firm with high product
quality. When a recall is from the firm with high product quality, consumers would generate
more negative emotions towards the recalling firm because they have a feeling of betrayal of
their trust (Liu and Shankar 2015). Product quality is measured by the reliability ratings collected
from Consumer Reports (CR). The rating ranges from 1 (the least reliable) to 5 (the most
reliable). Press coverage about recalls also influences consumers’ preferences towards a recalling
firm (Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). I measured press coverage by counting the
number of news articles about the focal firm’s product recalls during a calendar year (Liu and
Shankar 2015). I collected data on press coverage from LexisNexis.
Recall scope measures the harm severity of recalled products, which influences consumers’
commitment to the recalling firm (Germann et al. 2014). Products can be recalled due to either
major or minor problems (Gao et al. 2015). Major problems cause more severe consequences
like fire or car crash, while minor problems do not significantly hurt consumers’ safety. Higher
recall volume means more consumers are likely to be hurt. The severity of a single product recall
can be measured by recall reason as I did in Essay 1. For example, a product recall due to brake
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Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations.
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
5
77.93
7.24
1
1 Firm Reputation
4.63
3.04 -.127
1
2 Recall Frequency
**
4.37
2.04 -.034 .415
1
3 Recall Volume
.19
.13
.150
-.163 -.047
1
4 Recall Clumpiness
*
Recall
Pace
-45.08
3.18
.006
-.156
-.057
-.208
1
5
**
*
*
**
6 Recall Recency
84.26
78.17
.128 -.455
-.213
.203 -.308
**
**
Media
Coverage
34.85
41.62
-.073
.503
.294
.180
-.059
7
3.11
1.00
.154
-.142
.020
.090
-.053
8 Product Quality
9 Competitor's Recalls 37.01
7.60
.026
-.100 -.156 -.095
.033
**
**
.36
.32
-.044 .386
.550
-.040
.001
10 Recall Scope
**
*
p <.01 <.05
SD =Standard Deviation
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6

1
-.083
.247*
-.146
-.282**

7

8

9

1
.101
1
-.077 .055
1
*
.209 -.134 -.111

10

1

failure is more severe than that because of lock issue. However, recall reason is not enough to
measure the harm severity of repeated recalled products because product recalls due to major
problems affect different number of items. Hence, to measure the breadth of the harm severity of
repeated product recall, I take recall volume into consideration. Thus, the harm severity of
repeated recalled products can be affected by two factors: recall reason and recall volume.
Taking these two factors into consideration, I measure recall scope by entropy (Frennea, Han,
and Mittal 2019; Palepu 1985). Equation (9) is the formula for calculating recall scope. Table 7
reveals descriptive statistics of all variables in this essay.

(9)

𝐽𝐽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 × ln
𝑗𝑗=1

1
𝑃𝑃𝐽𝐽

𝑃𝑃𝐽𝐽 = The ratio of recalled items due to major problems to the total recalled items;

J = the number of major problems

Model Specifications
I employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model to test the dynamic interactions among recall
frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, recall recency, and firm reputation.
VAR is a time-series method that can simultaneously analyze a system of equations (Luo 2009).
The marketing literature has widely used VAR (e.g., Fang et al. 2015; Luo 2009; Pauwels et al.
2004; Trusov et al. 2009). For example, Fang et al. (2015) use VAR to examine the dynamic
evolution of sellers’ click price, buyers’ click rate, and search advertising revenue in a businessto-business electronic platform. Hewett et al. (2016) use VAR to study the dynamic interactions
among traditional media news stories, firm communications, online word of mouth, consumer
sentiment, and consumer deposits in the financial services industry.
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VAR is preferred in this study for the following reasons. First, VAR can account for the
issues of endogeneity, nonstationarity, and reversed causality, because it can capture the
interdependent evolution of the focal variables by treating each variable as potentially
endogenous (Fang et al. 2015). Recall timing and firm reputation could influence each other. A
quick product recall could indicates that the recalling firm is socially responsible for and cares
about its consumers (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Siegel and Vitalino 2007). Hence, a firm could
recall its products quickly to minimize the damage to its reputation (Eilert et al. 2017). Thus,
recall timing influences firm reputation, meanwhile, the concern over firm reputation in turn
affects the timing of product recalls.
Second, VAR is able to identify which variables Granger-cause other variables (Granger
1969). Granger causality test investigates whether variable A explains variable B, beyond B’s
own prior values. Therefore, Granger causality test serves as a good proxy for causality. As for
this study, results of Granger causality test can show whether the features of product recall
pattern (i.e., recall frequency, recall volume, recall scope, recall pace, and recall irregularity) can
cause the change in firm reputation.
Third, VAR can capture the long-term effect of frequent product recalls on firm reputation.
The effect of a product recall could persist and influence a recalling firm’s reputation for several
years. Impulse response functions (IRFs) derived from VAR can show the evolving impact of the
various features of a product recall pattern on firm reputation.
PVAR-X model. Since I investigated repeated product recalls from a certain number of firms
across a period of years, I specify a Panel VAR-X (PVAR-X) model in Equation (10). Recall
frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, recall recency, and firm reputation are
focal variables. In the PVAR-X model, X represents control variables, which include a recalling
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firm’s product quality, press coverage about a recalling firm’s product recalls, recall scope, and
the number of recalls from competitors. In equation (10), I use first differences of variables (i.e.,
∆Variablet=Variablet-Variablet-1) to account for some unobservable fixed effects such as firm
size, brand diversification, and country of origin.

∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
⎡ ∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ⎤
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
⎢
⎥
∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
(10) ⎢ ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
⎢
⎢∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
⎣ ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎦

𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
⎡
⎤
⎢ 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞 ⎥
𝑃𝑃 𝛽𝛽 𝑃𝑃
11
⎢ 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 ⎥
+
�
=⎢
�
⋮
𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ⎥
𝑃𝑃
𝛽𝛽
⎢
⎥ 𝑝𝑝=1 61
𝜃𝜃
⎢ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⎥
⎣𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ⎦

∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝
⎡
⎤
∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 ⎥
𝑃𝑃 ⎢
𝛾𝛾11
⋯ 𝛽𝛽16 ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
⎢
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 ⎥
+� ⋮
⋱
⋮ �⎢
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 ⎥
𝑃𝑃
𝛾𝛾41
⋯ 𝛽𝛽66
⎢
⎥
⎢∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 ⎥
⎣ ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 ⎦

𝜀𝜀∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
⎡ 𝜀𝜀∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎤
∆𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
⋯ 𝛾𝛾14 ⎡
⎤ ⎢ 𝜀𝜀
⎥
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
⎥ + ⎢ ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
⋱
⋮ �⎢
𝜀𝜀
⋯ 𝛾𝛾44 ⎢ ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ⎥ ⎢ ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
𝜀𝜀
⎣ ∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ⎦ ⎢ ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎥
⎣ 𝜀𝜀∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⎦

Where Rep = the recalling firm’s reputation; Frq = product recall frequency; Vlm = product
recall volume; Pce = product recall pace; Clmp = product recall clumpiness; Rcny = product
recall recency; Qual = a recalling firm’s product quality; Cvr = the press coverage of the
focal firm’s recalls; Cmp = the number of competitors’ recalls; Scp = product recall scope;
i=1,2,…,N is the firm index. t=1,2,…, M is the year index; θ= intercept; P= the number of
lags; The direct effects on firm reputation are β21, β31, β41, β51, β61 for recall frequency, recall
volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, and recall recency, respectively. Feedback effects
from recall frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, and recall recency to
firm reputation is β12, β13, β14, β15, β16, respectively. The carryover effects and are β11, β22,
β33, β44, β55, and β66, respectively. The remaining coefficients are cross-effects between any
two of recall frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, and recall recency. 𝚪𝚪
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(𝛾𝛾11,… 𝛾𝛾66) is the vector of coefficients of control variables for each equation. ε is the error
term for the system of equations.

Unit root tests. Before estimating PVAR-X, I checked for stationarity via unit root tests.
Time series data might be influenced by trends or seasonality, which would affect the mean and
variance of the data over time. A stationary time series is characterized as a constant mean and
variance over time. To check whether trends or seasonality influences data analysis, I employed
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; Dickey and Fuller 1979) to examine stationarity and
unit root for each variable across time series.
The null hypothesis of a unit root test is that a time series variable is not stationary in that it
possesses a unit root. As is shown in Table 8, ADF test statistics of the first-differenced firm
reputation, recall frequency, recall volume, recall pace, recall clumpiness, and recall recency are
-5.903, -16.918, -15.208, -13.370, -17.662 and -18.086, respectively (p<.01). Therefore, the
variables in this study are stationary.
In addition, I also checked whether variables about the features of product recall pattern have
the issue of multi-collinearity since these five features are related. After regressing firm
reputation on these features, I found that all values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are smaller
than 2.2 (Recall Frequency: 2.154; Recall Volume: 1.264; Recall Clumpiness: 1.203; Recall
Pace: 1.219; Recall Recency: 1.666).

Model Estimation
Due to the small sample size in this study, I used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to
determine the appropriate lags (Hurvich and Tsai 1989). Results of AIC show that the
appropriate number of lags is four years. Hence, I estimated the VAR model of Equation 1
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Table 10. Summary of Unit Root and Stationary Tests of the Variables.
Variables
Statistics
p-Value
conclusion
∆ Firm Reputation
∆ Recall Frequency
∆ Recall Volume
∆ Recall Clumpiness
∆ Recall Pace
∆ Recall Recency

-5.903
-16.918
-15.208
-17.662
-13.370
-18.086

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

Stationary
Stationary
Stationary
Stationary
Stationary
Stationary

with four lags. Table 9 shows the estimation results from the reduced-form VAR Model with a
four-lags specification. For example, the second column in Table 9 shows that recall frequency
can hurt firm reputation one year later, but recall pace can help firm reputation in the following
four years. Table 10 shows the results of Granger causality Wald tests, indicating that firm
reputation can be better explained by recall frequency, recall volume, recall recency, recall pace,
and recall clumpiness than by a firm’s reputation in the lagged period. Table 9 also shows that
recall frequency can increase recall pace, which is reasonable since if a firm has a higher recall
frequency, it has to recall its products more quickly (higher recall pace) during a year.
To better understand the dynamic impact of the focal independent variables (i.e., recall
frequency, recall volume, recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness) on the dependent
variable (i.e., firm reputation), I need to investigate generalized impulse response functions
(GIRFs) that consider the dynamic interplay among the variables. The advantage of GIRF is that
it is consistent to the ordering of the variables in the VAR.
GIRFs capture the longitudinal effect of a one unit shock in recall frequency, recall volume,
recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness on the value- of firm reputation. Figure 4 shows
the response of firm reputation to a recall frequency shock. X axis is years, and Y axis is the
percentage change in firm reputation. The dash lines are the 95% confidence intervals of the
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value on the sold line. In Figure 4, the 95% confidence intervals exclude zero and are negative,
indicating that recall frequency begins to damage the recalling firm reputation one year later.
Because confidence intervals of responses include zero from the second year, recall frequency’s
influence starts to fade in the second year. Therefore, recall frequency negatively affects firm
reputation. Figure 5a and Figure 5b depict the relationship between recall volume and firm
reputation at 95% and 90% confidence intervals. Since the 95% confidence intervals include zero
in the first year but the 90% ones do not, recall volume hurts the recalling firm’s reputation one
year later at the 90% confidence intervals. Therefore, similar to recall frequency, recall volume
harms firm reputation. Figure 6 indicates that recall recency positively affects the recalling firm’s
reputation one year later, supporting H1. Figure 7 indicates that recall pace positively affects the
recalling firm’s reputation one year later, supporting H2. Figure 8 indicates that recall
clumpiness hurts the recalling firm’s reputation one year later, not supporting H3.
To determine to what extent the five characteristics of product recall pattern differently
influence reputation, I report the forecast-error variance decomposition in Table 11. Forecast
error variance decomposition allows researchers to compare the effects of different factors. Table
10 shows that a unit shock in recall frequency can explain about 20% of the variance in the
forecast error of firm reputation. The numbers for recall volume, recall recency, recall pace,
recall clumpiness, and firm reputation are 24%, 4%, 7%, 5%, and 40%, respectively.

Discussion
This essay primarily examines the effect of frequent product recalls on recalling firm’s
reputation. I identify five features of frequent product recalls: recall frequency, recall volume,
recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness. After analyzing data from the US automobile
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Table 11. Estimation results from the reduced-form VAR model.
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables

Firm
Reputation
(t)

Recall
Frequency
(t)

Recall
Volume
(t)

Recall
Clumpiness
(t)

Recall
Pace
(t)

Recall
Recency
(t)

Constant

1.119*

-3.9681

-1.7441*

.1731*

-119.752***

-0.2998

0.0221

-3.346

158.7082***
-14.1909**

Firm Reputation (t-1)

.6967***

-0.2222

Firm Reputation (t-2)

-.2028

**

0.3443

-0.0167

-2.2

-6.8373

Firm Reputation (t-3)

.1145*

-0.4076

-0.2635

-0.0175

0.734

11.3392**

Firm Reputation (t-4)

-0.0801

-0.1312

0.2229

0.0373

0.7272

9.8778**

Recall Frequency (t-1)

-.0978**

-.8164***

0.1323

0.0016

2.5048*

9.9859***

Recall Frequency (t-2)

-0.0355

-.552**

0.1242

-0.0025

2.657

24.0294***

Recall Frequency (t-3)

-0.0367

-.6138**

0.0243

0.0092

1.9093

24.4714***

Recall Frequency (t-4)

-0.0231

-.7298***

0.0718

.0201**

1.2044

1.9655**

Recall Volume (t-1)

-.0796*

-0.0285

-.8500***

.0174***

-4.3162***

-7.7024***

Recall Volume (t-2)

.1412*

-0.2425

-.4972**

0.0106

-9.2126***

-26.6741***

Recall Volume (t-3)

.1450*

-0.0989

-0.2336

-0.0057

-8.9396***

-23.5189***

Recall Volume (t-4)

.1312***

0.1149

-0.0684

-.0130*

-4.8980***

-16.9552***

Recall Clumpiness (t-1)

-2.5344**

-1.4716

-1.5604

-.6789***

151.9838*** 299.4385***

Recall Clumpiness (t-2)

-4.7162***

-1.1887

0.2235

-.5700***

106.7275*** 329.0798***

Recall Clumpiness (t-3)

-2.6686***

2.0613

-0.7407

-.6539***

83.1831**

205.2335***

Recall Clumpiness (t-4)

-2.8648***

2.7036

0.1982

-.3747***

19.2376

213.9737***

Recall Pace (t-1)

.0134***

-0.0155

0.0009

0.0008

-1.2771***

-1.2832***

Recall Pace (t-2)

.0219***

0.0069

0.0079

-0.0005

-1.4882***

-1.4675***

Recall Pace (t-3)

.0267***

-0.0039

0.0052

-.0021**

-1.1261**

-1.5224***

Recall Pace (t-4)

.0079**

.0245*

-0.0102

-0.0001

-0.0232

0.188

Recall Recency (t-1)

.0072***

0.0013

-0.0066

-0.0002

-.1573***

-1.0882***

Recall Recency (t-2)

.0050**

0.0089

-0.0032

0.0002

0.0142

-.9527***

Recall Recency (t-3)

.0051**

0.0109

-0.0037

-0.0001

0.0527

-.5746***

Recall Recency (t-4)

.0049***

-0.0063

-0.0024

-0.0001

-0.0437

-.4933***

Press Coverage (t)

-0.0005

.0404***

0.0029

0.0003

.4790***

.6178***

Product Quality (t)

-.2274**

0.231

0.4935

-0.0114

1.9591

22.5800***

Competitors' Recalls (t)

-0.0024

0.0284

-0.0451

-0.0024

2.1026***

0.7249

Recall Scope (t)

0.2604

2.3430**

5.0702*** -.0968**

12.4113

19.6048

R-square

79.25%

75.51%

72.62%

77.81%

83.84%

*

**

.826

***

***

p<.1; p<.05; p<.01
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83.21%

Table 12. Results of the granger causality tests (Minimum p-Values across 4 Lags).
Dependent variable
Firm
Recall
Recall
Recall
Recall
Reputation Frequency Volume Clumpiness Pace
Firm Reputation
—
<.1*
0.499
<.01***
0.47
*
Recall Frequency
<.1
—
0.764
0.161
0.561
***
**
Recall Volume
<.01
0.715
—
<.05
<.01***
Recall Clumpiness
<.01***
0.671
0.845
—
<.01***
Recall Pace
<.01***
0.229
0.682
<.01***
—
***
Recall Recency
<.01
0.103
0.694
0.552
.01***

Recall
Recency
<.01***
<.01***
<.01***
<.01***
<.01***
—

***

p-value<.01; **p-value<.05;*p-value <.1

Percentage Change
Year

Figure 4. Response of firm reputation to recall frequency shock
Figure 4: The solid line indicates the percentage change of one unit shock in recall frequency on the
future value of firm reputation. The dash lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the percentage
change. Figure 4 shows that the 95% confidence intervals are below zero at year 1, indicating that one
unit shock in recall frequency reduces about 10% of firm reputation one year later. Because the 95%
confidence intervals include zero at year 2, 3, and 4, recall scope does not influence on firm reputation
after one year.
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Percentage Change
Year
Year

Figure 5a. Response of firm reputation to recall volume shock (95% CI).

Percentage Change
Year

Figure 5b. Response of firm reputation to recall volume shock (90% CI).

Figure 5: The solid line indicates the percentage change of one unite shock in recall volume on the future
value of firm reputation. The dash lines represent the confidence intervals of the percentage change.
Figure 5a shows that the 95% confidence intervals include zero at year 1 but Figure 5b shows that the
90% confidence intervals are below zero at year 1, indicating that one unit shock in recall volume reduces
about 8% of firm reputation one year later. Because the confidence intervals include zero at year 2, 3, and
4 in Figure 5a and Figure 5b, recall volume does not influence on firm reputation after one year.
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Percentage Change
Year

Figure 6. Response of firm reputation to recall recency shock.

Figure 6: The solid line indicates the percentage change of one unit shock in recall recency on the future
value of firm reputation. The dash lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the percentage change.
Figure 6 shows that the 95% confidence intervals are above zero at year 1, indicating that one unit shock
in recall recency increases about .7% of firm reputation one year later. Because the 95% confidence
intervals include zero at year 2, 3, and 4, recall recency does not influence on firm reputation after one
year.

Percentage Change
Year

Figure 7. Response of firm reputation to recall pace shock.
Figure 7: The solid line indicates the percentage change of one unit shock in recall pace on the future
value of firm reputation. The dash lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the percentage change.
Figure 7 shows that the 95% confidence intervals are above zero at year 1, indicating that one unit shock
in recall pace increase reduces about 1.3% of firm reputation one year later. Because the 95% confidence
intervals include zero at year 2, 3, and 4, recall irregularity does not influence on firm reputation after one
year.
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Percentage Change
Year

Figure 8. Response of firm reputation to recall clumpiness shock.
Figure 8: The solid line indicates the percentage change of one unit shock in recall clumpiness on the
future value of firm reputation. The dash lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the percentage
change. Figure 8 shows that the 95% confidence intervals are above zero at year 1, indicating that one
unit shock in recall clumpiness reduces about 20% of firm reputation one year later. Because the 95%
confidence intervals include zero at year 2, 3, and 4, recall irregularity does not influence on firm
reputation after one year.

Table 13. Forecast-error variance decomposition of firm reputation
Recall
Recall
Recall
Recall
Recall
Firm
Frequency Volume Recency Pace
Clumpiness Reputation
Variance Variance Variance Variance
Variance
Year Variance
0.0848
0.1347
0.0579
0.0156
0.0272
0.6798
1
0.0687
0.2806
0.0536
0.0703
0.05
0.4768
2
0.1066
0.2686
0.0508
0.0727
0.0471
0.4542
3
0.1949
0.2488
0.0445
0.0699
0.0462
0.3957
4
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industry, I find that the five features affect the recalling firm’s reputation differently. Findings in
this essay provide significant implications for scholars and practitioners.

Theoretical implications
This essay enriches the product recall literature by studying frequent product recalls. Unlike
prior studies that mainly examine a single product recall, this essay focuses on the product recall
pattern caused by frequent product recalls. My findings suggest that frequent product recalls
affect the recalling firm’s reputation. Product recalls have drawn considerable attention from
scholars in the past decade given the increasing number of product recalls in industries.
However, prior studies mainly investigate the influence of a single product recall on consumers’
attitudes either by conducting lab experiments (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Germann et al. 2014;
Klein and Dawar 2004; Lei, Dawar, and Gürhan-Canli 2012) or by analyzing empirical data
(Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Liu and Shankar 2015), assuming that product recalls
are independent of each other or ignoring the “repeated” feature of product recalls. To fill the
research gap, I examine the effect of the pattern of repeated product recalls on firm reputation
given my access to a unique dataset called the CoreBrand Index. Scholars have paid attention to
repeated innovation events, such as new product announcements (Warren and Sorescu 2017),
new product introductions (Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar 2018), and service innovation (Dotzel
and Shankar 2019). Warren and Sorescu (2017) emphasize that future studies need to focus on
other frequent firm events. Product recalls are ubiquitous in the market so that “do more frequent
product recalls in the industry attenuate or amplify the reaction of consumers?” (Cleeren,
Dekimpe, & van Heerde, 2017, p.595). This essay responds to this research call by identifying
five characteristics of repeated product recalls: recall frequency, recall volume, recall recency,
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recall pace, and recall clumpiness, and shows that these five features influence firm reputation
differently. The findings of this essay demonstrate that firm reputation, in the long run, is
influenced by how frequent product recalls are temporally announced, opening a door for future
research on product recalls.
To investigate the impact of product recalls on firm reputation, prior studies tend to use lab
experiments to examine consumers’ response to a single recall in terms of their brand perception
(e.g. Klein and Dawar 2004; Lei, Dawar, and Lemmink 2008) and brand purchase (Dawar and
Pillutla 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013). Although lab experiments can effectively
test the effect of a single product recall on consumer reactions, they hardly capture consumers’
reactions to frequent product recalls because of the difficulty in event manipulations. To
overcome this challenge, I combined annual data on firm reputation from an independent dataset
called the CoreBrand Index and product recall data from NHTSA. Then, I employ a vector autoregression model to examine the long-term effect of the characteristics of product recall pattern
on the recalling firm’s reputation. The findings of this essay show that recall frequency and recall
volume damage a recalling firm’s reputation for one year, which indicates that frequent product
recalls prolong consumers’ negative reactions for one year. These findings are consistent with
the prediction of attribution theory, which suggests that frequent product recalls indicate the
stability of product recalls within the recalling firm, thus making consumers attribute these
product recalls to the recalling firm rather than other factors. Habituation theory infers that
frequent events of a firm could make consumers insensitive to the same event of the firm in the
future. For example, Warren and Sorescu (2017) find that investors are less excited to a firm’s
new product announcement when the firm announced more new product announcements in the
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past. However, my findings show that habituation theory is not applied to interpret the influence
of frequent product recalls on consumers’ attitudes towards the recalling firm.
My results also show that prior product recalls could help recalling firms reduce the number
of future product recalls (e.g., -.8164 in the third column in Table 9). This finding confirms the
presence of organizational learning from product recalls in the automobile industry (Haunschild
and Rhee 2004; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011).
Companies are able to improve product quality by learning from their mistakes that cause
product recalls, which could improve consumers’ positive attitudes towards the recalling firm in
the long term. However, the existing literature has not examined whether consumers are able to
detect the improvement. This essay goes further to investigate consumers’ reactions to frequent
product recalls. Results show that the increasing number of product recalls reduces the recalling
firm’s reputation, which indicates that even though companies can learn from their prior product
recalls, consumers might not sense or appreciate firms’ efforts on learning from their prior
recalls, such as improving product quality (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert 2013).
In addition, my findings contribute to the literature on recall timing. According to Eilert et al.
(2017), recall timing has been under-researched in the product recall literature and they
recommend that researchers include recall timing as an important variable when studying the
performance consequences of product recalls. Referring to the literature on direct marketing
(Zhang, Bradlow, and Small 2015), I identify three characteristics of product recall timing: recall
recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness. The findings in this essay show that when firms
need to recall their products multiple times, they need to announce their recalls during a short
period (i.e., the effect of recall pace). My results also reveal that recalling firms’ reputation suffer
more from inconsistent product recalls than from consistent product recalls, especially, when
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their product recalls are clustered into groups over a calendar year (i.e., the effect of recall
clumpiness). This finding is contrast to my hypothesis on recall clumpiness. One possible reason
could be that consumers usually have stronger impressions with product recalls occurring in a
short time since they are reminded of product recalls continually through mass or social media
(Borah and Tellis 2016). The impression can also last longer in consumers’ mind. When another
group of product recalls occurs later, consumers can easily remember the firm’s previous product
recalls, perceiving the stability of product recalls within the firm. However, when a firm recalls
its products on a periodic basis, the media might not be interested in reporting the regular recalls
since these recalls are not new to the media. Due to the less exposure of news about product
recalls, consumers pay less attention to product recalls from the firm, thus generating less
negative attitudes towards the recalling firm.
Results show timing clumpiness damages firm reputation in the context of product recalls,
thus enriching the product recall literature from the perspective of the event timing. Recent
attention has been paid to the timing regularity of firm events. For example, Sharma et al. (2018)
study how irregularity in new product introduction affects the stock market value of the firm.
However, they find a non-significant effect. In this essay, I also investigated the effect of recall
irregularity, finding that recall irregularity does not affect a firm’s reputation. The major
difference between timing irregularity and timing clumpiness is that the latter is able to capture
the time interval between the event and the observed point. Hence, timing clumpiness is a better
measurement than timing irregularity on the consistency of firm event
Regarding control variables, I find that product quality can hurt the recalling firm’s
reputation. This finding is consistent with the findings from prior studies, which argue that
consumers feel betrayal of trust when product recalls are from a firm that provides high-quality
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products (Liu and Shankar 2015; Rhee and Haunschild 2006). I also find that recall scope does
not affect the recalling firm’s reputation. In my study, recall scope measures the harm severity of
recalled products. This finding might suggest that in the automobile industry, consumers might
be not concerned about what causes product recalls.

Managerial implications
My findings also provide some implications for managers. Product recall is not unfamiliar to
managers, especially in the automobile industry, who have been suggested some strategies of
responding to product recalls (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Eilert et al. 2017). For example,
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) suggest that managers better keep silent to product recalls and
avoid proactively announcing a product recall. Eilert et al. (2017) suggest that once a firm’s
products are under investigation, the firm should announce its products as soon as possible;
otherwise, the stock market will penalize them. These studies mainly focus on a single product
recall. Due to the complexity of products, firms tend to recall their products frequently. Mangers
might think frequent product recalls have little impact on their firm’s reputation because product
recalls are announced so frequently that consumers may become insensitive to the recalls. Mary
Barra, the CEO of General Motors, stated that “our company’s reputation won’t be determined
by the recall itself, but by how we address the problem going forward” (Hsu and Lawrence 2016,
p.59). However, my results show that frequent product recalls indeed influence a firm’s
reputation. Specifically, the number of product recalls hurts the recalling firm’s reputation.
Therefore, managers need to realize the “repeated” feature of product recalls. This finding
suggests that managers should try to reduce the times of announcing product recalls. If a firm can
recall its product at one time, it should not announce product recalls multiple times.
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In practice, it is inevitable for firms, especially, automakers, to recall their products multiple
times in one year. Our results indicate that managers can manage recall timing to reduce the
damage to their firms’ reputation from repeated product recalls. In detail, a firm’s manager
should announce its multiple recalls closely but avoid them in clusters. It is worth mentioning
that my results do not necessarily indicate that managers cannot delay their recalls of products
that are under investigation, but suggest that if a company is investigating several potential
recalls, it is better for the company to announce all of its product recalls over a short period
(quickly) rather than over a long period (slowly). Moreover, if a firm has to recall its products
over a long period, it is better for the firm to avoid announcing several clustered product recalls
over the long period.

Limitations and future research
Although this essay provides some insightful findings, it still has some limitations, which
could be addressed in the future research. First, this essay is limited to automobile data because
of highly frequent product recalls in the industry. However, product recalls are also common in
other industries, such as healthcare, consumer products and food. Future studies can examine the
characteristics of frequent product recalls in other industries to test the generalization of findings
in this essay. Second, social media empowers consumers to voice their concerns. Product recalls
as a negative event might spread fast in social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.
How does frequent product recalls affect online word of mouth (volume, valence, growth rate,
and breadth; Hsu and Lawrence 2016)? Answering this research question can expand the
literature on product recalls. Third, new product announcement is also a repeated firm event
(Sharma, Saboo, and Kumar 2018). Future research can connect new product announcement with
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product recall announcement because the former is a positive event, while the latter is a negative
event. How can the two repeated events interplay each other to enhance firm reputation?
Addressing this research question can provide managers with suggestions on how to manage
different firm events to maximize the reputation of their firms.

85

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
The last two decades have witnessed growing product recalls. In this dissertation, I examine
the spillover effect of product recalls on competitor’s market value, and the long-term effect of
frequent product recalls on a recalling firm’s reputation. My findings deepen our understanding
of product recalls and provide important theoretical and managerial implications.
My first essay investigates how product recalls affect the market value of a recalling firm’s
competitors. After analyzing data from the U.S. automobile industry, I find that product recalls
from a firm with high corporate product reliability hurt the market value of competitors. This
finding is called negative spillover effect in Essay 1. I also find that the negative spillover effect
can be attenuated when the competitor has high corporate product reliability. In addition, my
findings reveal that the effects also occur in the moment when the competitor pre-announces its
new products after the product recall. In detail, when the competitor pre-announces new
products, its market value is hurt by the recalling firm’s corporate product reliability. In addition,
competitor’s high corporate product reliability can weaken the negative impact. These findings
enrich the literature on the spillover effect of product recalls, and help managers of recalling
firm’s competitors better cope with product recalls in the industry.
My second essay examines how frequent product recalls influence a recalling firm’s
reputation in the long run. In this essay, I identify five features of frequent product recalls: recall
frequency, recall volume, recall recency, recall pace, and recall clumpiness. After analyzing data
about product recalls from the U.S. auto industry and firm reputation, I find these five features
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affect firm reputation differently during one-year period. My results show that recall frequency
and recall volume undermine firm reputation. My results also indicate that to reduce the negative
impact of product recalls on firm reputation, recalling firms need to recall their products quickly
(recall pace) but not in clusters (recall clumpiness). My findings provide scholars and managers
with insights into the timing of product recalls.

87

REFERENCES
Ahluwalia, Rohini, H. Rao Unnava, and Robert E. Burnkrant (2001), “The Moderating Role of
Commitment on the Spillover Effect of Marketing Communications,” Journal of Marketing
Research, 38 (4), 458–70.
Allen, Alexis M., Michael K. Brady, Stacey G. Robinson, and Clay M. Voorhees (2015), “One
firm’s loss is another’s gain: capitalizing on other firms’ service failures,” Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 43 (5), 648–62.
Anderson, Eugene W, Claes Fornell, and Sanal K. Mazvancheryl (2004), “Customer Satisfaction
and Quality,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (October), 172–85.
——— and Mary W Sullivan (1993), “The Antecedents and Consequences of Customer
Satisfaction for Firms,” Marketing Science, 12 (2), 125–43.
Bala, Ram, Pradeep Bhardwaj, and Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2017), “Pharmaceutical product
recalls: Category effects and competitor response,” Marketing Science, 36 (6), 931–43.
Balachander, Subramanian and Sanjoy Ghose (2003), “Reciprocal Spillover Effects: A Strategic
Benefit of Brand Extensions,” Journal of Marketing, 67 (1), 4–13.
Barber, Brad M and Masako N. Darrough (1996), “Product Reliability and Firm Value : The
Experience of American and Japanese Automakers, 1973-1992,” Journal of Political
Economy, 104 (5), 1084–99.
Borah, Abhishek and Gerard J. Tellis (2016), “Halo (Spillover) Effects in Social Media: Do
Product Recalls of One Brand Hurt or Help Rival Brands?,” Journal of Marketing
Research, 53 (2), 143–60.
Brauer, Karl (2014), “Why A Massive Safety Recall Hurt Toyota More Than,” Forbes, (accessed
July 1, 2014), [available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kbrauer/2014/07/01/why-massivesafety-recall-hurt-toyota-more-than-gm/#1c465336328c].
Cao, Charles, Timothy Simin, and Jing Zhao (2008), “Can growth options explain the trend in
idiosyncratic risk?,” Review of Financial Studies, 21 (6), 2599–2633.
Carhart, Mark M (1997), “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal of finance, 52
(1), 57–82.
Chen, Yu-Shan, Ming-Ji James Lin, and Ching-Hsun Chang (2009), “The positive effects of
relationship learning and absorptive capacity on innovation performance and competitive
advantage in industrial markets,” Industrial Marketing Management, 38 (2), 152–58.
Chen, Yubo, Shankar Ganesan, and Yong Liu (2009), “Does a Firm’s Product-Recall Strategy
Affect Its Financial Value? An Examination of Strategic Alternatives During Product-Harm
Crises,” Journal of Marketing, 73 (6), 214–26.
88

Cleeren, Kathleen, Marnik G. Dekimpe, and Harald J. van Heerde (2017), “Marketing research
on product-harm crises: a review, managerial implications, and an agenda for future
research,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 45 (5), 593–615.
———, Harald J. van Heerde, and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2013), “Rising from the Ashes: How
Brands and Categories Can Overcome Product-Harm Crises,” Journal of Marketing, 77 (2),
58–77.
Cook, Dennis R. (1977), “Detection of Influential Observations and Outliers in Regression,”
Technometrics, 19 (1), 15–18.
Dahlén, Micael and Fredrik Lange (2006), “A disaster is contagious: How a brand in crisis
affects other brands,” Journal of Advertising Research, 46 (4), 388–97.
Dawar, Niraj and Madan M. Pillutla (2000), “Impact of Product-Harm Crises on Brand Equity:
The Moderating Role of Consumer Expectations,” Journal of Marketing Research, 37
(May), 215–26.
Dickey, David A and Wayne A Fuller (1979), “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive
Time Series With a Unit Root,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74 (366),
427–31.
Dotzel, Thomas and Venkatesh Shankar (2019), “The Relative Effects of Business-to-Business
(vs. Business-to-Consumer) Service Innovations on Firm Value and Firm Risk: An
Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Marketing, 83 (5), 002224291984722.
Eilert, Meike, Satish Jayachandran, Kartik Kalaignanam, and Tracey A. Swartz (2017), “Does It
Pay to Recall Your Product Early? An Empirical Investigation in the Automobile Industry,”
Journal of Marketing, 81 (May), 111–29.
Eliashberg, Jehoshua and Thomas S. Robertson (1988), “New product preannouncing behavior:
A market signaling study,” Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (3), 282–92.
Epstein, Zach (2016), “Is the iPhone 7 exploding like the recalled Samsung?,” New York Post,
[available at https://nypost.com/2016/09/30/is-the-iphone-7-exploding-like-the-recalledsamsung/].
Erdem, Tülin and Baohong Sun (2002), “An Empirical Investigation of the Spillover Effects of
Advertising and Sales Promotions in Umbrella Branding,” Journal of Marketing Research,
39 (4), 408–20.
Fang, Eric (Er), Xiaoling Li, Minxue Huang, and Robert W Palmatier (2015), “Direct and
Indirect Effects of Buyers and Sellers on Search Advertising Revenues in Business-toBusiness Electronic Platforms,” Journal of Marketing Research, LII (June), 407–22.
Fombrun, Charles J. (1996), Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image ., Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Frennea, Carly, Kyuhong Han, and Vikas Mittal (2019), “Value Appropriation and Firm
Shareholder Value: Role of Advertising and Receivables Management,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 56 (2), 291–309.

89

Gao, Haibing, Jinhong Xie, Qi Wang, and Kenneth C Wilbur (2015), “Should Ad Spending
Increase or Decrease Before a Recall Announcement? The Marketing--Finance Interface in
Product-Harm Crisis Management,” Journal of Marketing, 79 (5), 80–99.
Germann, Frank, Rajdeep Grewal, William T. Ross, and Rajendra K. Srivastava (2014),
“Product recalls and the moderating role of brand commitment,” Marketing Letters, 25 (2),
179–91.
Granger, C.W.J. (1969), “Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Crossspectral Methods,” Econometrica, 37 (3), 424–38.
Gregory, James R. and Donald E. Sexton (2007), “Hidden Wealth in B2B Brands.,” Harvard
Business Review, 85 (3), 23.
Gregory, James R, Ronald K. Satterfield, and Brad Puckey (2018), “Does a culture of innovation
drive business results ?,” Journal of Cultural Marketing Strategy, 3 (1), 82–89.
Gregory, Jim and Michael Moore (2013), “Aligning Marketing and Finance with Accepted
Standards for Valuing Brands,” The Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation,
38 (10), 41–45.
Groves, Philip M. and Richard F. Thompson (1970), “Habituation: A dual-process theory,”
Psychological Review, 77 (5), 419–50.
Haunschild, Pamela R. and Mooweon Rhee (2004), “The Role of Volition in Organizational
Learning: The Case of Automotive Product Recalls,” Management Science, 50 (11), 1545–
60.
Hewett, Kelly, William Rand, Roland T. Rust, and Harald J. Van Heerde (2016), “Brand buzz in
the echoverse,” Journal of Marketing, 80 (3), 1–24.
Hsu, Liwu and Benjamin Lawrence (2016), “The role of social media and brand equity during a
product recall crisis: A shareholder value perspective,” International Journal of Research in
Marketing, 33 (1), 59–77.
Hult, G. Tomas M., Jeannette A. Mena, O. C. Ferrell, and Linda Ferrell (2011), “Stakeholder
marketing: a definition and conceptual framework,” AMS Review, 1 (1), 44–65.
Hurvich, Clifford M and Chih-Ling Tsai (1989), “Regression and Time Series Model Selection
in Small Samples,” Biometrika, 76 (2), 297–307.
Janakiraman, Ramkumar, Catarina Sismeiro, and Shantanu Dutta (2009), “Perception Spillovers
Across Competing Brands: A Disaggregate Model of How and When,” Journal of
Marketing Research (JMR), 46 (4), 467–81.
Jarrell, Gregg and Sam Peltzman (1985), “The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of
Sellers,” Journal of Political Economy, 93 (3), 512–36.
Kalaignanam, Kartik, Tarun Kushwaha, and Meike Eilert (2013), “The Impact of Product
Recalls on Future Product Reliability and Future Accidents: Evidence from the Automobile
Industry,” Journal of Marketing, 77 (March), 41–57.
Klein, Jill and Niraj Dawar (2004), “Corporate social responsibility and consumers’ attributions
90

and brand evaluations in a product-harm crisis,” International Journal of Research in
Marketing, 21 (3), 203–17.
Kohli, Chiranjeev (1999), “Signaling New Product Introductions: A Framework Explaining the
Timing of Preannouncements,” Journal of Business Research, 46 (1), 45–56.
Laczniak, Russell N., Thomas E. DeCarlo, and Sridhar N. Ramaswami (2001), “Consumers’
Responses to Negative Word-of-Mouth Communication: An Attribution Theory
Perspective,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 11 (1), 57–73.
Lei, Jing, Niraj Dawar, and Zeynep Gürhan-Canli (2012), “Base-Rate Information in Consumer
Attributions of Product-Harm Crises,” Journal of Marketing Research, 49 (June), 336–48.
———, ———, and Jos Lemmink (2008), “Negative Spillover in Brand Portfolios: Exploring
the Antecedents of Asymmetric Effects,” Journal of Marketing, 72 (3), 111–23.
Leswing, Kif (2016), “Samsung ngles its artphone recall,” Business Insider, [available at
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/apple-stock-rises-samsung-bungles-160933361.html].
Lilly, Bryan and Rockney Walters (1997), “Toward a Model of New Product Preannouncement
Timing,” Journal of Product Innovation Management.
Liu, Angela Xia, Yong Liu, and Ting Luo (2016), “What Drives a Firm ’ s Choice of Product
Recall Remedy ? The Impact of Remedy Cost , Product Hazard , and the CEO,” Journal of
Marketing, 80 (May), 79–95.
Liu, Yan and Venkatesh Shankar (2015), “The Dynamic Impact of Product-Harm Crises on
Brand Preference and Advertising Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis of the Automobile
Industry,” Management Science, 61 (10), 2514–35.
———, ———, and Wonjoo Yun (2017), “Crisis Management Strategies and the Long-Term
Effects of Product Recalls on Firm Value,” Journal of Marketing, 81 (September), 30–48.
Luo, Xueming (2009), “Quantifying the Long-Term Impact of Negative Word of Mouth on Cash
Flows and Stock Prices,” Marketing Science, 28 (1), 148–65.
——— and C. B. Bhattacharya (2006), “Corporate social responsibility, customer Satisfaction,
and market value,” Journal of Marketing, 70 (4), 1–18.
——— and C.B Bhattacharya (2009), “The debate over doing good: Corporate social
performance, strategic marketing levers, and firm-idiosyncratic risk,” Journal of Marketing,
73 (6), 198–213.
Mackalski, Robert and Jean-Francois Belisle (2015), “Measuring the short-term spillover impact
of a product recall on a brand ecosystem,” Journal of Brand Management, 22 (6), 485–485.
Magnusson, Peter, Vijaykumar Krishnan, Stanford A. Westjohn, and Srdan Zdravkovic (2014),
“The Spillover Effects of Prototype Brand Transgressions on Country Image and Related
Brands,” Journal of International Marketing, 22 (1), 21–38.
Maher, Amro A. and Anusorn Singhapakdi (2017), “The effect of the moral failure of a foreign
brand on competing brands,” European Journal of Marketing, 51 (5/6), 903–22.
91

Mizik, Natalie and Robert Jacobson (2003), “trading off between value creation and value
appropriation: the financial implications of shifts in strategic emphasis,” Journal of
Marketing, 67 (1), 63–76.
Oliver, Richard L (1977), “Effect of Expectation and Disconfirmation on Postexposure Product
Evalutions: An Alternative Interpretation,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 62 (4), 480–86.
Palepu, Krishna (1985), “Diversification Strategy , Profit Performance and the Entropy
Measure,” Strategic Management Journal, 6 (3), 239–55.
Pauwels, Koen, Jorge Silva-risso, Shuba Srinivasan, and Dominique M Hanssens (2004), “New
Products, Sales Promotions, and Firm Value : The Case of the Automobile Industry,”
Journal of Marketing, 68 (October), 142–56.
Pennings, Joost M.E., Brian Wansink, and Matthew T.G. Meulenberg (2002), “A note on
modeling consumer reactions to a crisis: The case of the mad cow disease,” International
Journal of Research in Marketing, 19 (1), 91–100.
Pettigrew, Andrew M (1992), “The Character and Significance of Strategy Process Research,”
Strategic Management Journal, 13 (Winter), 5–16.
Puzakova, Marina, Hyokjin Kwak, and Joseph F Rocereto (2013), “When Humanizing Brands
Goes Wrong : The Detrimental Effect of Brand Anthropomorphization Product
Wrongdoings,” Journal of Marketing, 77 (May), 81–100.
Rhee, Mooweon and Pamela R. Haunschild (2006), “The Liability of Good Reputation: A Study
of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry,” Organization Science, 17 (1), 101–17.
Roehm, Michelle L and Alice M Tybout (2006), “When Will a Brand Scandal Spill Over, and
How Should Competitors Respond?,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (3), 366–73.
Rutz, Oliver J. and George F. Watson (2019), “Endogeneity and marketing strategy research: an
overview,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 47 (3), 479–98.
Seo, Soobin, SooCheong Shawn Jang, Barbara Almanza, Li Miao, and Carl Behnke (2014), “The
negative spillover effect of food crises on restaurant firms: Did Jack in the box really
recover from an E. coli scare?,” International Journal of Hospitality Management, 39, 107–
21.
Sharma, Amalesh, Alok R. Saboo, and V. Kumar (2018), “Investigating the Influence of
Characteristics of the New Product Introduction Process on Firm Value: The Case of the
Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal of Marketing, 82 (September), 66–85.
Shepardson, David (2017), “Auto Recalls Hit Record 53.2 Million in 2016,” Automotive News,
(accessed March 10, 2017), [available at
http://www.autonews.com/article/20170310/RETAIL05/170319989/auto-recalls-hit-record53-2-million-in-2016].
Siegel, Donald S. and Donald F. Vitalino (2007), “An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of
Corporate Social Responsibility,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 16 (3),
773–92.

92

Sorescu, Alina B., Venkatesh Shankar, and Tarun Kushwaha (2007), “New Product
Preannouncements and Shareholder Value: Don’t Make Promises You Can’t Keep,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (3), 468–89.
Sorescu, Alina, Nooshin L. Warren, and Larisa Ertekin (2017), “Event study methodology in the
marketing literature: an overview,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 45 (2),
186–207.
Su, Meng and Vithala R. Rao (2010), “New product preannouncement as a signaling strategy:
An audience-specific review and analysis,” Journal of Product Innovation Management, 27
(5), 658–72.
——— and ——— (2011), “Timing decisions of new product preannouncement and launch
with competition,” International Journal of Production Economics, 129 (1), 51–64.
Sullivan, Mary (1990), “Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products,” Journal of
Business, 63 (3), 309–29.
Talay, M. Berk, M. Billur Akdeniz, and Ahmet H. Kirca (2017), “When do the stock market
returns to new product preannouncements predict product performance? Empirical evidence
from the U.S. automotive industry,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 45 (4),
513–33.
Thirumalai, Sriram and Kingshuk K. Sinha (2011), “Product Recalls in the Medical Device
Industry: An Empirical Exploration of the Sources and Financial Consequences,”
Management Science, 57 (2), 376–92.
Topaloglu, Omer and Omer N. Gokalp (2018), “How brand concept affects consumer response
to product recalls: A longitudinal study in the U.S. auto industry,” Journal of Business
Research, 88 (July 2016), 245–54.
Trump, Rebecca K. and Kevin P. Newman (2017), “When do unethical brand perceptions spill
over to competitors?,” Marketing Letters, 28 (2), 1–12.
Trusov, Michael, Randolph E Bucklin, and Koen Pauwels (2009), “Effects of Word-of-Mouth
Versus Traditional Marketing: Findings from an Internet Social Networking Site,” Journal
of Marketing, 73 (5), 90–102.
USDA (2016), “Summary of Recall Cases in Calender Year 2016,” [available at
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recallsummaries/].
Van de Ven, Andrew H. (1992), “Suggestions for Studying Strategy Process: A Research Note,”
Strategic Management Journal, 13 (Winter), 169–91.
Warren, Nooshin L. and Alina Sorescu (2017), “Interpreting the Stock Returns to New Product
Announcements: How the Past Shapes Investors’ Expectations of the Future,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 54 (5), 799–815.
Weiner, Bernard (1980) (1985), Human Motivation, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Whelan, Jodie and Niraj Dawar (2016), “Attributions of blame following a product-harm crisis
93

depend on consumers’ attachment styles,” Marketing Letters, 27 (2), 285–94.
Wu, Yuhong, Sridhar Balasubramanian, and Vijay Mahajan (2004), “When Is a Preannounced
New Product Likely to Be Delayed?,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (2), 101–13.
Zhang, Yao, Eric T. Bradlow, and Dylan S. Small (2015), “Predicting customer value using
clumpiness: From RFM to RFMC,” Marketing Science, 34 (2), 195–208.
Zhao, Yi, Ying Zhao, and Kristiaan Helsen (2011), “Consumer Learning in a Turbulent Market
Environment: Modeling Consumer Choice Dynamics After a Product-Harm Crisis,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 48 (2), 255–67.
Zhou, Chen, Shrihari Sridhar, Rafael Becerril-Arreola, Tony Haitao Cui, and Yan Dong (2019),
“Promotions as competitive reactions to recalls and their consequences,” Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 47 (4), 702–22.

94

